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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on the French Navy's resource management effects in
the areas of ship construction, maintenance, and personnel. The central
question is whether the French Navy will be able to both upgrade an ageing
fleet, and man that projected new fleet with qualified personnel, given
defense budget constraints and the fact that naval pay scales are falling below
those in the private sector. The thesis concludes that novel approaches to
maintenance and upkeep, and a reform of length of service contracts may
help the French Navy meet its global missions. The thesis recommends that
the French Navy consider greater cooperation with the U.S. Navy so that both
navies may avoid wasting time and money investigating maintenance and
procurement methods already employed or abandoned by the other. It also
recommends greater standardization of responsibilities, methods, and
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The information in this thesis has been obtained from unclassified public
documents and unclassified interviews with French sources who have been
promised anonymity. The author's intention to write an unclassified thesis
on the topic was made clear to all interviewees. Interview dates are indicated
in the references. The views expressed and the conclusions drawn from those
interviews are those of the author alone, and should not be construed to
represent those of the Department of the Navy, or any U.S. government
agency, or those of the sources. The findings are necessarily tentative, owing
to the reliance on interview sources, the lack of comprehensive public data
on some issues, and the French Navy's own non-standardized information
management systems for some matters.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The political, financial, and military spheres of the modern nation-state
are inextricably intertwined. In a period of binding budget constraints, a
dwindling manpower pool, profound international changes, and demanding
technological modernization, the problems of resource management and
strategic planning become increasingly important on every level. This thesis
is intended to analyze the French Navy's recent efforts to manage its capital
and personnel resources, and to map strategies for the future in the light of
the current financial and political situation. The success of these resource
management strategies will determine the Navy's ability to meet the
requirements of France's future global military missions.
Because France maintains a navy with global missions (including sea
control, power projection, and nuclear deterrence) similar to those of the U.S.
Navy, we may learn something useful for our own planning and strategy by
examining the French Navy's current situation. Since the French fleet
operates in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and in some areas of the
world beyond Europe (the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa, the
South Pacific, etc.), French naval forces are important potential partners of the
U.S. Navy, and as such we can benefit by knowing more about the strengths
and limitations of the French Navy. But the large size of the French Naval
establishment makes it necessary to be selective in choosing issues
representative of the main resource management problems.
B. JUSTIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY.
The thesis includes two main chapters: the first is concerned with surface
ship upkeep problems, and the second with French Naval personnel. The
justification for choosing these specific problems (as opposed to other strategic
considerations, such as ship construction priorities) is due to the particular
pressure that constrained budgets have placed on these two priorities.
These two chapters examine critical inputs to the French Navy's
operational production function. The manner in which the French Navy
manages these resource inputs will determine whether it will be more or less
effective in pursuing its global security interests in years to come. The
production function (Q) for the Navy can be written as follows:
Q = f(K,L!,L2)
Where Q = Naval Output, or readiness (the ability to meet military missions)
K = Ships and Material (Capital)
Li = Human Capital 1 , professional service personnel
L2 = Human Capital, conscripts
The inputs K, Li, and L2 are combined by the French Navy to produce output
Q.2
For the last decade the defense budget has been averaging (in current
francs) 3.65 percent of the Gross National Product. (The Navy's share has
averaged 19.08 percent of the defense budget.) Interestingly, between 1986 and
1991 TITLE V3 increased from 55.69 to 64.80 percent, while TITLE III4 has
]Human Capital—"The abilities, skills, and health of human beings that
can contribute to the production of both current and future output.
Investment in training and education can increase the supply of human
resources." (Gwartney, Macroeconomics, p. 533).
2Naval output (Q) can be evaluated using various measures of readiness.
Substitutions can exist between the inputs (K, L], L2) that will maintain the
same level of readiness and possibly produce cost savings. If inputs are
complements in production then the loss of some of one input may have
magnified consequences in terms of output (readiness). A discussion of how
the U.S. and French Navies measure readiness is found in Chapter II and
Appendix C.
3The Navy's budget is divided into two major appropriations, TITLE V
and TITLE III. TITLE V represents capital investments. It is divided into
research and development (R&D), new construction, and naval facilities. The
input (K) mostly reflects TITLE V expenditures. The second major
appropriation, TITLE III is divided into salaries, social benefits (e.g., health)
operations and maintenance (O&M), and special subsidies (e.g., Navy
Museum), the human capital inputs (Liand L2) are subsumed under TITLE
EQ. (loi de finances)
4TITLE III, in simplified terms, is divided into fixed and variable costs.
Salaries and social benefits are fixed costs to the Navy because they cannot
decreased from 44.31 to 35.20 percent. 5 Presumably the French Navy's goal is
to maximize output (Q) given the employment of resources from TITLE HI (Li
and L2) and TITLE V (K) and existing budgetary constraints. Each chapter in
the thesis surveys current problems faced by the French Navy in managing its
resource inputs (K, Li, and L2) efficiently, and evaluates alternative solutions
under consideration.
C OUTLINE.
Chapter II deals primarily with K, i.e. ships and material inputs.
Specifically, the upkeep periods of naval surface ships are reviewed. The
review reveals problems posed to ships' life cycles in extending the intervals
between upkeep. The motivation for extending upkeep intervals and the
methods used to determine the maximum period between upkeep are
addressed. The technical assistance that the U.S. Navy could provide in this
matter is also investigated.
control these costs (i.e., inputs Li and L2 tend to be fixed in the short run).
The variable costs are those that the Navy can "control" and are generally
referred to as O&M costs. Since 1986, O&M as a percentage of the Navy budget
has decreased from 19.27 to 12.75 percent (or 14.16 percent without the transfer
of funds—see Footnote 5). These funds pay for almost everything that affects
crew morale such as habitability iimprovements, training, and ship upkeep.
Chapter I discusses this in more detail.
5More precise accounts indicate that TITLE V has risen from 55.69 to 63.39
percent while TITLE III has decreased from 44.31 to 36.61 percent. The
discrepancy comes from a shifting of maintenance funds in 1989 of 500
million francs ($90.9 million) and in 1991 of 540 million francs ($98.2 million)
from TITLE III to TITLE V. This money was TITLE III upkeep money directly
transferred and used for the same purpose under TITLE V. The reason for the
shift was that major maintenance was accomplished in those years which are
considered capital investments because they seriously improve the ship's life.
(See Appendix C.)
One objective of the second chapter is to help clarify the motivation
behind the 1988 decision to extend the time between ship upkeep periods. It
is intended not only to address the origins of upkeep extensions, but also to
consider any possible ramifications on the future of the French fleet.
Descriptions and opinions concerning the extended periods between ship
upkeep have been obtained primarily through interviews.
Chapter EI deals with the declining Title III budget (salaries, training, etc.)
and its effect on personnel (both L^ and L2). The impact on recruitment and
reenlistment is examined in the case where this declining trend continues.
Finally, the potential impact of a change in national military service (affecting
L2) on overall naval readiness is also examined.
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS.
A review of French defense budget documents provides information for
comparisons between investment (procurement, R&D) and operating
expenses (military personnel, O&M). All monetary figures are given in
French francs and the dollar equivalent, using an exchange rate of 5.5 francs
per dollar.
In the most general terms, this thesis is intended to advance the
understanding of problems of resource management and strategic planning
through an analysis of the French Navy's efforts to manage its personnel (Li
and L2) and capital (K) resources to accomplish its missions (Q).
Because the Navy's success in managing its resources to obtain efficient
production (i.e., minimizing costs of accomplishing its missions or
maximizing missions, given budgetary constraints) will determine its ability
to meet France's global military objectives, another goal of this thesis is to
attempt a reasonable forecast as to how successful that optimization might be.
The most important specific and relevant questions include the following:
1. Will the French continue to extend the time lag between the ship
upkeep maintenance periods, and if so, what will be the long-term
effects?
2. Will Title III continue to decrease, and how will this trend affect
recruiting and reenlistments? What may be the indirect effect on
naval construction goals?
3. Will the French Navy be able to man its ships or will shortfalls be
evident in 1996 when the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle begins its
sea trials?
II. CHANGES IN THE FRENCH NAVY'S MANAGEMENT OF SHIPS AND
MATERIALS
A. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1980s the French Navy was forced by stringent budget cuts to
reevaluate its policies regarding maintenance, personnel, and equipment.
This chapter discusses strategies undertaken to develop a more cost-effective
maintenance system, the status of the current upkeep system, and new
proposals the French Navy hopes will increase a ship's longevity within the
budgetary constraints. Effective management of its capital resources (K) will
give the Navy more flexibility in consecrating resources to resolve problems
that affect the morale of its personnel (Li and L2). (See Appendix C.)
B. THE BASIC STRATEGY: EXTENDING THE INTERVALS BETWEEN
MAJOR UPKEEP MAINTENANCE
1. Rationale:
From 1960 to 1978 the French conducted maintenance on their
equipment in accordance with the manufacturer's guidelines, but found their
work actually harmful to the equipment. As one interview source put it,
"The more it is taken apart, the less it works!" The Navy was spending more
time conducting scheduled maintenance and then repairing the repairs than
doing actual maintenance. [Ref. 3]
As a result, the French Navy decided in late 1988 (a decision that was
made official in 1990), to experiment with the possibility of extending the
intervals between maintenance periods. This meant extending the life cycle
envelopes of the equipment without knowing its actual limits. [Ref. 4]
2. Determining the Interval For External Maintenance
There are three hull conditions currently being evaluated in
prolonging the interval between IPER. 6 The intention is to be able to
maintain an interval of 24 to 60 months depending on the type of ship. The
questions under review are:
1. Is it technically possible to maintain the interval? Will the equipment
be able to last without major work being accomplished between IPERs?
2. Can the paint hold up for the period in question?7
3. Can corrosion be held back sufficiently to meet the interval?8
6IPER (Indisponibilie Periodique d'Entretien et de Reparation)—Major
ship upkeep period (see Appendix A.)
7At present the paint on the hulls of French ships lasts approximately 36
months. An alternative for the French Navy is to employ the type of paint
and application process currently used on U.S. Navy hulls. The paint
employed for FFG-7 class ships lasts 61 months.
8To further increase hull life, sacrificial anodes made out of aluminum or
zinc are attached to the ship's hull. The anode is more chemically active with
seawater than the ship's steel hull. Therefore the reaction with the seawater
will be concentrated at the anode saving the hull. This type of cathodic
protection is used aboard most French ships. The F70 George Leygues and
Cassard classes use an impress current cathodic protection system. This
method supplies the hull with a current forcing it to become a cathode and
therefore resisting corrosion. A study is underway by the French Navy on the
use of impress current aboard the Eridan (tripartite) class minhunters and the
Durance class replenishment tankers. [Ref. 5]
8
3. Pierside Maintenance
As a partial response to minimum manning of ships, the Majority
Generale9 in Brest and Toulon has a new upkeep assistance team for ships.
This group, called the "Equipe, Entretien de Surface," consists mainly of
unskilled personnel who are conscripts in the Navy doing their national
military service. If a ship is to be in port for longer than 72 hours, the
commanding officer can request the team from his squadron commander.
The team (L2) chips and paints hulls (with materials provided by the Majority
Generale), permitting the ship's crew (Li and L2) to concentrate on deck and
interior ship upkeep. This concept has been proven at Brest and is now
under evaluation at the base in Toulon. [Ref. 6 and 7]
The French Navy is in the process of designing a technical assistance
team to function in the same manner as the "Equipe, Entretien de Surface." It
will be composed of mid-grade to senior petty officers possessing the various
technical skills necessary to work on machinery, electronic, and electrical
systems. The team will also work for the Majorite Generale and can be
requested by commanding officers to assist ship's company during inport
periods. It is the intention of the French Navy to have this team in place by
1992.[Ref. 8]
4. Determining the Interval for Machinery Maintenance
Internal ship maintenance primarily addresses the needs of the
machinery. The interval between upkeep periods for this area is normally
9Majorite Generale—Unit in naval port responsible for ship's upkeep.
(See Appendix A.)
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bound by operating hours (e.g. a pump has maintenance conducted or is
overhauled when it reaches a designated number of hours of operation). A
ship's main propulsion diesel engine (MPDE) undergoes various inspections
and maintenance that must be performed at different intervals of operation.
Thus far, maintenance guidelines have been established by the manufacturer.
The French Navy is investigating the possibility of delaying some, if not all,
of the conditional maintenance until the IPER. Currently the responsible
officials have not collected sufficient equipment operating data to be able to
establish their own maintenance timetable. They do have data on small
auxiliaries such as pumps, but the larger equipment (such as MPDEs) is still in
the process of being evaluated. In order to delay the conditional
maintenance, squadron and fleet commanders may have to make decisions as
to which ship to send on a mission based on the operating hours of its
machinery. There is no slack in the IPER program. The limits have been
stretched to the point that equipment maintenance cannot be delayed past a
scheduled IPER without risking equipment failure.
For the past two years, a reduction of maintenance experiment has
been conducted in Toulon on the small boats assigned to the base (such as
tugs). The working order of equipment is verified, but no maintenance is
performed unless absolutely necessary. The Majority G£n£rale has saved
about one half of its normal upkeep expenses without having any major
equipment failures. [Ref. 9 and 10]
These ships are not complex engineering marvels (French Navy
harbor tugs have only one diesel), and they can be easily monitored because
they never leave port. This experiment needs to continue for a sufficient
10
amount of time (say for 10 years) in order to determine the effects on the
lifespan of the ships. In addition, a comparison needs to be made with past
machinery problems to help determine the validity of the experiment's
results.
Since 1980 the Navy has cut back on the number of ships dedicated to
particular missions, reducing mission strength to 80 or 90 percent of what it
was prior to 1980. The Navy has made a conscious decision to decrease the
amount of unnecessary underway periods. Priority is given to operational
necessities. Prior to 1980 the Navy sent more ships than were required to
participate in exercises. Today fewer ships are sent, sometimes only the
minimum required to maintain a presence.
The goals are to maintain operational and training commitments,
and not to interfere with the IPER cycle. The Navy may have to cancel an
exercise or a ship's participation in the exercise in order to meet these goals. If
the number of underway days has to be increased, every effort is made to
ensure that the minimum number of days of upkeep (i.e. PEI10) is respected.
Readiness is being driven by the new maintenance constraints. [Ref. 11 and 12]
At this time the condition of a ship's main engines determines the
interval between its IPER (excepting aircraft carriers, where the determining
factors are the condition of the catapults and the engines). To make it easier
to determine required maintenance intervals, the French Navy has started to
install vibration monitoring equipment aboard ships to measure the effects of
10PEI (Periodes d'Entretien Intermediate)—Minor upkeep period. (See
Appendix A.)
11
vibration on main propulsion and auxiliary equipment. The decision in 1990
to record and enter the data in a computer and to correlate the information
from ships of the same class should enable the Navy to make reliable
predictions as to equipment performance, once a sufficient data base is
established. 11 An example of the planned IPER cycle for major combatant
ships follows:

































nFrench Navy ships currently have broad band vibration measuring
equipment. They intend to replace this equipment with vibration measuring
equipment that will give broad band and narrow band measurements. Large
ships (Aviso A69 and larger) will be equipped with computers that will be
able to analyze the information collected by the vibration monitors. Group or
squadron commanders of smaller ships will maintain a pool of vibration
analyzing equipment for the ships. This project will begin in 1991 with
equipment being given to the SCMN. In 1992 installation will begin, the
process is expected to take two to three years. [Ref. 13]
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The new approach also involves changes in the upkeep of weapon
systems; systematic scheduled maintenance trips to a workshop for
dismantling to verify operational status have been replaced by "conditional"
visits (only when necessary). The equipment receives maintenance based on
the results of diagnostic testing which assures repair personnel that
maintenance requirements are well-founded. Through close tracking of
operating characteristics, the French Navy avoids useless equipment
dismantling. [Ref. 15]
There is always a chance that diagnostic testing will not catch an
incipient equipment failure that a close inspection through dismantling
would have caught. This is the tradeoff currently being made, and the French
Navy needs to track the results in order to determine the most effective
methods. Unfortunately, a lack of computerized historical data currently
prevents or hampers this type of analysis.
5. Major Upkeep Maintenance
Extending the maintenance envelope between IPER is a cost-saving
measure that means that ships will enter drydock less often. They will still
have a drydocking period at each IPER in order to repair the paint from the
keel to the waterline. (The Aviso A69 class will drydock midway between
IPERs, approximately every two and one half years.)
The approximate base price per day for a ship drydocked in Toulon
(less than 20 meters long) is 2,970FF ($540).n The average ship spends two
12Costs are based on several factors, including security provided by
civilians, operating the drydock, overhead costs, and equipment maintenance
costs. There are 12 drydocks at the naval shipyard in Toulin and the fixed
13
weeks in drydock so the price to the Navy for just the time in drydock (not
taking into account the actual docking refloating) is 41,580FF ($7,560) [Ref. 16].
When a ship does enter its EPER, all work is supervised by the DCN.13
But before a ship commences an IPER there is an inspection called the pre-
IPER conducted by the SCMN14 and the DCN to determine the work that
must be accomplished (work that absolutely cannot wait until the next EPER).
The Majorite Generale is responsible for paying the DCN in advance for the
work to be accomplished during the IPER. It has a programmed annual
budget that includes the price for the IPER. If there are any cost overruns, it is
up to the Majorite Generale to shift funds from other programs to pay for the
overruns. The SCMN is the Majorite Generale's arm and is responsible for
assessing the quality of the work at the end of the EPER.
The Majorite Generale is responsible for the ships' upkeep plan. It
submits the annual budget estimate to the Naval headquarters in Paris which
is responsible for dividing the maintenance money among all its branches.
The need for cost-saving measures such as extending the IPER
envelope can be seen when there is a budget shortfall. The amount accorded
to Toulon for 1992 is less than that requested by the Majorite Generale; now it
is faced with revising the upkeep plan for its ships. It has three choices: to
costs for each of the drydocks are spread out based on the number of ships that
are drydocked during the year.
13DCN (Direction des Constructions Navales)—Civilian branch of the
defense department responsible for naval ship construction and weapon
systems. (See Appendix A).
14SCMN (Service de Control du Materiel Naval)—Unit of technically
skilled senior petty officers. (See Appendix A.)
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delay work, to deny particular work requests, or to cancel one ship's
maintenance to shift money to more pressing work required on another.
Money is stretched so tight that if a ship (because of an unscheduled mission)
puts more hours on its engines than anticipated, the Majorite Generale will
have a difficult time finding the money to pay for maintenance. It will have
to once again face the same three choices [Ref. 17]. The possibility also exists
that maintenance support (i.e., DCN) might not be available at that particular
time because of the amount of work already in progress or because of long
lead-time requirements in procuring parts [Ref. 18].
The French Navy has not kept central computerized records of ship
material readiness. As each of the different regions Toulon, Brest, Cherbourg,
and Tahiti is in charge of its own ships, no comprehensive compilations have
been made to identify problems particular to a certain class of ship. This fact,
coupled with the lack of a computer bank of historical data, places the French
Navy in the very early stages of shipboard repair problem correlation and
makes the scheduling of major upkeep maintenance a somewhat risky
business.
C AT SEA MAINTENANCE
1. The French System of Reporting and Repairing Shipboard Equipment
Casualties
A. When a casualty to a piece of shipboard machinery occurs, the
commanding officer sends a message to Service de Controle du
Materiel Naval (SCMN).
15
B. SCMN investigates the problem (usually within 24 hours) and sends a
message to either the AMF15 or the Majorite G£n6rale. If the AMF
cannot accomplish repairs, the problem is left for the Majority Generale
to resolve.
C. The Majority G6n£rale then assigns the work to the DCN of that
particular port. The DCN usually handles the most difficult and urgent
jobs.
D. Once the repair to the equipment is complete, messages are sent to the
various administrative and operational chains of command.
E. Each Monday, commanding officers of ships are required to send a
message to the Majorite Generale listing the equipment problems that
still exist. The Majorite Generale is responsible for tracking the status of
the equipment in order to effect repairs in as expeditious and
inexpensive a manner as possible.
At the end of each month the Majorite Generale receives an Etat de
Depense. This is a bill sent by the DCN for all work performed by their
organization for the Majorite Generale. Every effort is made to keep this bill
to a minimum16 , and so all work is meticulously scrutinized by the SCMN.
When the DCN does the work, it is accomplished by civilians and it usually
involves costly overtime. The SCMN is tasked to supply Quality Assurance
(QA) inspectors at the completion of the DCN's work.[Ref. 19]
The SCMN arm of the Majorite Generale is also responsible for
technical studies, and these are grouped into (1) machinery and (2) all other
equipment. SCMN personnel, already highly technically skilled when they
arrive at SCMN, augment their expertise by attending civilian factory training
15AMF (Atelier Militaire de la Flotte)—Naval shore personnel who
specialize in shipboard repairs. (See Appendix A.)
16The Majorite Generale tries, whenever possible, to assign jobs to the
SCMN or AMF and to avoid the DCN.
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sessions. Large ships such as aircraft carriers and cruisers have their own
"experts" and do not usually use SCMN services. Ships from the Aviso A69
class on down call upon the SCMN to provide troubleshooting services.
The problem is that the various SCMNs do not work together to
solve problems. They meet once a year to discuss problems, but this is not
enough to compile and correlate data regarding technical difficulties in the
fleet. Moreover, there is no standardization between them. When the
SCMNs in Toulon and Brest conduct validation checks on the same type of
diesel engine, it is not at all guaranteed that they will use the same
methodology. There is no standard check list used by all SCMNs for the same
material verifications (i.e., telling them which points to check and in what
order). The French Navy believes that SCMN personnel are experienced
enough to obtain the required results and therefore has not standardized their
methods. [Ref. 20] However, this policy makes it difficult for one SCMN to
compare results with another SCMN.
The SCMN has started tracking all shipboard problems in order to
begin conducting correlation studies (e.g., are there problems common to a
class of ships?). In Brest, the SCMN has begun to put its information on
computers to establish the necessary data base for correlation. A similar effort
is underway in Toulon; but the two SCMNs are not working together to set
up the same systems to make compilation and correlation easier.
Another difference between the SCMNs in Toulon and Brest is their
involvement in repair. Toulon tries to repair as much as possible in the area
of weapon system and electronics (i.e., radars and television sets) using its
own repair facility, and avoids sending work to the DCN. Brest, on the other
17
hand, has a different approach; it does not repair equipment and only
investigates and provides repair recommendations. [Ref. 21 and 22]
A third major difference is in manning. The Toulon SCMN has
more ships involved in operations, including France's two ageing aircraft
carriers, and is understaffed. In the machinery area (i.e., pumps, engines) it
has only 5 of the 9 required billets filled. The Commanding Officer billet was
left unfilled for 3 months. This is significant since all equipment casualties,
as well as pre-IPER and post-IPER verifications, are its responsibility. Brest
does not have this problem; it is fully manned. In fact it is currently
overmanned. This is because the Majorite Generale sends them personnel
that are "stashed,"17 thus providing valuable manual assistance to SCMN
personnel. [Ref. 23 and 24]
Whenever a casualty to a piece of equipment occurs, commanding
officers are required to report the ship's readiness status up the chain of
command. This keeps operational and administrative commanders abreast
of the mission preparedness of their units and informs the repair
commanders of possible assistance that they might be obliged to render.[Ref.
25]
2. DCN Costs
The DCN employs government workers called POE (Personnel
Ouvrier d'Etat). These are permanent employees that cannot be laid off.
17
"Stashed" personnel are those who for one reason or another are
temporarily assigned to a command while waiting to report to their next
permanent assignment. This is usually for a period of short duration, one to
three months.
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Their salaries are fixed costs for the DCN whereas the salaries of workers
subcontracted from local industry can be considered variable costs. An
increase in the amount of work brings an increase in subcontractors; less
work means fewer subcontractors. Regulations governing the POE do not
allow this sort of flexibility.
With the IPER interval change, the amount of work being given to
the DCN is decreasing; but DCN costs to the Navy are rising. This is because
the POE fixed costs (i.e., salaries) continue to rise and the number of POEs
does not significantly change. In the last five years the number of POEs has
decreased only slightly (a drop of approximately 1.6 percent) [Ref. 26]. The
overall cost of a POE increases and that is passed on to the Navy as part of
DCN costs. These costs are divided amongst the projects that the DCN does
for the Navy. (See Appendix D.) In addition, if there are fewer projects
(which is the case at the present time), the fixed costs must be divided
amongst the fewer projects, and are allocated accordingly. The final project
costs then do not necessarily reflect the specific work accomplished.
The DCN also maintains at least a minimum of subcontractors so as
not to lose its resource pool. This sometimes leads to paying POEs who have
done little, if any, work. [Ref. 27]
At the base in Toulon the amount of work for the DCN has decreased
for the following reasons:
a. An increase in the amount of upkeep work given to the crew.
b. The contribution of the AMF and SCMN in accomplishing repairs.
c. The assignment of some of the newer ships to Toulon and the
decommissioning of the older ships.
d. Budgetary constraints. [Ref. 28]
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Since POEs cannot be fired or even moved from one region of France
to another (except voluntarily), the fixed costs remain a burden to the Navy.
If a POE does not wish to move to where there is more work (e.g., Lorient to
Brest), he need not; he will continue to be paid.[Ref. 29] As a consequence the
Navy must displace personnel and ships to try to maintain a certain amount
of work in the various arsenals for the DCN. This contributed to the shifting
of the Aviso A69 IPERs from Brest and Toulon to the DCN at Lorient. [Ref. 30]
3. Determining Sea Readiness: U.S. versus French Methods
The U.S. Navy does not determine a ship's readiness for sea in the
same manner as the French Navy. The U.S. determination is based on unit
status 18—that is, whether the ship's material condition and trained personnel
are sufficient to meet all mission areas. SORTS (Status of Resources and
Training System) is an evaluation, in percentage terms, of operationally ready
equipment and of the personnel having the requisite training for conducting
missions at sea. If there is a degradation of a ship's material condition
exceeding 50 percent, the determination can be made to keep the ship tied up.
(See Appendix B.)
The French Navy determines readiness at the squadron level. When
a ship reports a casualty, the squadron commander looks at the upcoming
mission for that ship and decides whether the casualty affects its ability to
perform the mission. It is not as rigid a system as SORTS. A French ship
could be so significantly degraded that it could not meet its normal mission
18
"The ability of a unit to perform the primary naval wartime mission
areas assigned. The principal components are personnel, equipment/supplies
on hand, equipment status, and training." [Ref. 31]
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area, but if the assigned tasking were such that the breakdown of equipment
would not have a disabling impact, the ship could still be ordered to sea.[Ref.
32]
The idea of keeping the chain of command informed as to the
readiness of units is the same in both navies; the methodology employed is
different. The discrepancy in the sizes of the two fleets helps to explain the
difference. The French utilize a method which relies on direct contact
between senior staff and individual units. Because the U.S. fleet is much
larger, readiness determinations are made by commanding officers using the
SORTS matrix. French-style "micromanaging" by senior staff is logistically
impossible in the U.S. Navy.
4. A Strategy for the Nineties
In October 1990 the French Navy began what might be called a
"Bump-'Em" Series of IPER (chaine d'IPER) for the Aviso A69 class ships (20
in all, including 17 Avisos A69, 2 depot and support ships, and the Albatros).
Originally the IPER was to be conducted in the major Aviso A69 homeports
of Toulon and Brest. The French Navy had set the following parameters
when programming the original cost of the new IPER sequence:
a. The IPER site would be at a major Aviso A69 homeport so that the
crew would not be away from its homeport and families while ashore
for 6 months.
b. There would not be a need for extra berthing support (i.e., a berthing
barge) because the majority of the crew would go home in the evening.
c. The crew would accomplish 2000 hours of upkeep work onboard the
ship during IPER.
A political decision in response to the awarding of the fregate de
surveillance (patrol frigate) contract to Saint-Nazaire (a decision discussed
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further in this chapter) changed the IPER site from the two homeports to
Lorient [Ref. 33]. This presented the Navy with the major problems of (a)
maintaining crew morale while having an IPER out of homeport and (b)
minimizing additional costs. The solution is unique, and the impact will not
be known before the end of 1991.
The Navy decided to reassign the crew of the ship, a sort of "placing
out of commission" during the IPER. When the Ditroyat (the first in the
series) arrived at Lorient, the crew turned over all of the ship's
documentation to a detachment of six naval personnel assigned to the
project. They placed all of this paperwork in vaults and took "responsibility"
for maintaining the ship's documentation. The officers and crew were then
detailed to new jobs in the Navy. The Detroyat's IPER is supervised by the
DCN at Lorient, and the DCN has full responsibility for the ship. A few weeks
before the completion of the Detroyat's IPER, the Jean Moulin, the second
ship in the series scheduled for IPER, will arrive and conduct a turnover to
the six-man naval detachment. The officers and crew debarking the Jean
Moulin will then man the Detroyat, becoming her "new" crew. The IPER
series will continue with each successively arriving crew debarking and then
embarking on the departing Aviso A69. The second IPER series (chaine
d'IPER) is scheduled to begin in July 1991. [Ref. 34 and 35]
This system does take care of crew morale in the short run; the crew
is not ashore away from homeport for 6 months. The long term effects are
still unknown, but a very plausible scenario could come to pass. If an Aviso
A69 spending a lot of time at sea due to operational reasons enters IPER, its
crew could actually end up spending more time away from homeport than if
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it had remained aboard during the IPER, for the "new" ship would most
likely be the one tasked for operational missions—being in the best shape and
having the least number of operating hours on its equipment. In addition, it
would already have a highly trained crew.
An additional problem is that some Aviso A69 crews will change
homeports when they change ships. The Jean Moulin comes from Brest, but
when the crew changes to the Ditroyat, they will also find themselves headed
to their new homeport of Djibouti. Some ships will change homeports within
France. Even though this is carefully orchestrated by the Naval headquarters
in Paris, it will mean a cost to the Navy in terms of moving families. [Ref. 36]
The question of "additional" cost is still under investigation. The
2000 hours of upkeep work that was earmarked for the crew will now be
accomplished by the civilian work force of the DCN. A study by French naval
personnel is underway to determine what this additional cost will be. From
an engineering plant operator's point of view, it is noteworthy that none of
the crew will have observed the work that was accomplished on the
equipment nor will any of the crew be familiar with the history of the
equipment onboard that particular ship. This means a loss of historical
"hands on" knowledge that usually proves quite valuable when
troubleshooting equipment and systems.
An alternative and more equitable solution might have been to leave
the crew aboard and to use military aircraft and/or ground transportation to
bring the crew home to their families each weekend. Driving time from
Lorient to Brest is approximately 1 hour, and flying time to Toulon is 3 hours.
This system would have made the crew available for the earmarked work,
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and they could have supervised the work being accomplished during the
IPER. As stated earlier, the current system is under evaluation and the effects
will not be known until at least the second ship completes its IPER and
becomes operational (scheduled for the summer of 1991). During the Ditroyat
IPER the DCN has been surprised at how long it takes to do some of the basic
seamanship labor that is normally accorded to the crew. By the time the Jean
Moulin completes her IPER, the DCN will have developed a sufficient
knowledge base to be able to accurately project the total cost of the IPER.
If all goes according to schedule, as the last ship in the Aviso A69
series finishes its IPER, it will be time for the Detroyat and the Jean Moulin to
put in again and continue in the endless "chain" the French have in mind.
[Ref. 37]
The Aviso A69 ships are dispersed throughout the fleet, with eight in
Brest, five in Toulon, three in Cherbourg, and one in the Indian Ocean [Ref.
38]. In 1991 Brest will only have half of its Avisos A69 available. Four of them
will in IPER at Lorient. The principal mission of these ships is coastal Anti-
submarine Warfare (ASW) operations. These ships complement the ASW
frigates in assuring security for the Force Oceanique Strategique (FOST), the
strategic nuclear submarines. Even though half of the Aviso A69 force will
not be available, their missions still need to be fulfilled. There are two
choices:
• increase the activity of the available ships, even though the norm
has already been attained for the Avisos and surpassed for the frigates;
• take and utilize an Aviso from the division at Cherbourg. This will
only shift the problem.
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In either case, training and participation in exercises will again have
to be greatly reduced until the return of the Avisos in 1993. [Ref. 391
Two benefits of the Aviso A69 IPER system are already apparent. The
first is that the Navy "gained" for reassignment the 90 personnel who were
decrewed from the Detroyat when she first arrived at Lorient. This is
important at a time when the Navy is experiencing manning problems. [Ref.
40] The second positive result concerns supply. When the Detroyat decrewed,
everything could be taken off; and a complete and accurate inventory and
validation of all supply parts was conducted. Since the Navy is able to
physically verify all of the spare parts, it can also review their history and
decide whether it is really necessary to put the parts back on board. [Ref. 41]
This type of scrutiny never happens on manned ships because parts are
"hoarded" in case they are ever needed.
A second political decision that has greatly affected the French Navy
was the awarding of the fregate de surveillance (Floreal class) new
construction contract to the Chantiers de l'Atlantique de Saint-Nazaire
instead of to the government-owned Lorient Naval Shipyard. There will be a
total of 6 ships of the class built at Saint-Nazaire. As these particular ships are
designed to operate in low threat areas, the Navy decided to reduce their cost
by constructing them to merchant marine regulations called SOLAS (Safety Of
Life At Sea) and VERITAS. 19 This political decision came as a blow to the
19SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) and VERITAS regulations are standard
civilian vessel regulations. These ships (unlike military ships) are not
required to withstand Shockwaves from mines or have redundant electrical
systems to minimize battle damage from missiles. They are required to meet
certain damage control requirements for combating fires at sea. VERITAS is a
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Navy because each ship represents 600,000 to 700,000 hours of work, and the
Lorient shipyard is lightloaded and badly needs the work.20
The total cost of one fregate de surveillance is estimated to be 500
million francs ($91 million). [Ref. 43 and 44] Because the ships are being built
by a civilian shipyard, the Department of Industry (Ministere de L'Industrie)
pays 60 million francs ($11 million) of the construction to Saint Nazaire.[Ref.
45] The cost to the Navy for the Saint Nazaire fixed-price contract is 200
million francs ($36 million). The Florial, first of the six ships, took two years
to build and was delivered on time.
The Navy was able to salvage a solid 10 percent of the work for the
DCN at Lorient by awarding it the weapon systems installation package.
Work by Lorient is not fixed-price but is negotiated based on 20,000 hours of
work. The actual price will rise (or fall) depending on actual hours worked.
The other 240 million francs ($43.6 million) includes projected DCN work
hours and the cost of outfitting the ship (i.e. radars, guns, bullets, etc.). [Ref.
46]
On the other five ships of the Floreal class, Lorient will have 20 to 25
percent of the work, with 10 percent of that on the superstructure [Ref. 47].
civilian firm in France that approves civilian ship construction plans to
verify that they meet standard safety regulations. Their ceritifcation is needed
for insurance purposes. VERITAS approved the plans for the Florial class
ships and conducts checks at the shipyard throughout the construction
process. [Ref. 42]
20To make up for the lack of work for the DCN, a second political decision
was made to conduct the avisor A69 IPER series at the Lorient naval shipyard.
This decision was reportedly contrary to the Navy's desires.
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Saint-Nazaire was responsible for building Flortal, but the DCN and
Saint-Nazaire engineers were supposed to work closely together during the
construction process to minimize difficulties in the weapon systems
installation process scheduled for Lorient. Unfortunately, this did not
happen. Saint-Nazaire delivered a "completed" ship to Lorient, and now the
DCN is cutting holes in the ship for weapons installation and cabling routes
for the electrical connections. A close working relationship between Saint-
Nazaire and the DCN would have minimized this "reconstruction" process.
The lack of communication will entail a double cost to the Navy, because the
Navy paid Saint-Nazaire to "complete" the ship and now it is paying the
DCN to cut up the ship and put it back together. [Ref. 48]
The decision, at first glance, seems to have been made purely to save
the French shipbuilding industry. If Saint-Nazaire had not been awarded the
contract, the last of France's major civilian shipyards would have folded. But
during the bidding process, Saint-Nazaire clearly underbid the DCN at
Lorient, and in an era of budget cuts and weakening defense industries, costs
as well as good lobbying play major roles in securing contracts. Saint-Nazaire
built the Floreal on time (two years from signing of the contract to delivery)
and will build the other five ships by 1993. It is doubtful whether the DCN at
Lorient could have met this delivery schedule. 21 Saint-Nazaire specializes in
21The La Fayette class of light frigates has a full load displacement of 3,200
tons, a length of 360ft, and a beam of 45ft. This class of ships has a cost per
ship of about 1,100,000,000 francs ($200 million). The Florial class has a 2,950
ton full load displacement, a length of 307ft, and beam of 46 ft. The estimated
cost of each Floreal class ship is 500,000,000 francs ($91 million). These ships
are built under different regulations (military versus SOLAS) and their
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constructing ships under SOLAS regulations and desperately needed the work
to survive (an incentive). [Ref. 50]
The French Navy has made a concerted effort in the last three years to
improve the living conditions on her ageing ships. The average age of ships
in the French combat fleet is 17 years, and comfort standards have changed
during that time. Minimum living standards and a high noise level
undermine—or have an adverse impact—on crew morale, but the French
Navy does not have the necessary funds to make large improvements in
habitability, although an effort is made to dedicate some funds at each IPER to
ameliorating living conditions. [Ref. 51] Due to the lack of funds, work
formerly accomplished by the DCN, such as painting berthing areas, is being
accomplished by ship's crews during their IPER. The two aircraft carriers have
received special funds ((20 million FF ($3.6 million) for the Foch's 1991 IPER))
for improving the dining and sanitary areas. [Ref. 52 and 53]
There are other major concerns when it comes to the aircraft carriers.
The Clemenceau is 30 years old and is programmed to remain in service until
at least 1998 when the Charles de Gaulle becomes active. Already 28 years old,
the Foch is expected to last until 2005 when she should be replaced by the
weapon systems are not the same. These two facts account for some of the
large price difference. But another significant difference is that the La Fayette
class is buit by the DCN in the Naval shipyards, while the Florial class work is
being accomplished by a civilian shipyard. The DCN is reluctant to give out
information regarding shipbuilding and repair costs or the number of hours
(projected or actual) for a construction project. French sources indicate that
questions are being raised as to why costs are so high for work contracted to
the DCN. [Ref. 49]
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second nuclear aircraft carrier.22 In 1995/1996 the Foch is scheduled for a one-
year overhaul which has the estimated cost of 100 million francs ($18.2
million). (See Appendix E.) [Ref. 54]
D. CONCLUSION
The question as to whether or not the increased interval between IPERs
will produce the anticipated cost savings does not yet have a clear answer.
The newness of the program and the lack of an engineering historical data
bank prevent the French from making long range predictions at this time.
One French source did in fact conduct an informal, private, one-year
maintenance cost-evaluation study. He found that increasing the interval
between IPER from 18 to 24 months produced a cost-savings gain of only 4
percent (versus the 27 percent straight-line expectation). Cost savings were
not linear due to the rise in the expenses of everyday maintenance.
Expanding the time interval between IPERs before ensuring that it is
technically sound to do so appears premature—"look before you leap." The
French Navy clearly understands this potential liability but sees this method
as the only viable option if it wants to start obtaining cost savings
immediately. It does not have the luxury of a Naval Ship Systems
Engineering Station (NAVSSES) 23 with in-place equipment to investigate
22The relief for the Foch is hypothetically because funds have not been
appropriated for a second nuclear aircraft carrier. In order to have an
operational relief for the Foch in 2005 funds must be appropriated beginning
in the 1993/1994 time frame.
23NAVSSES (Naval Ship Systems Engineering Station)—The U.S. Navy's
principal test and evaluation center for hull, mechanical, and electrical
(HM&E) ship systems and submarine antenna and periscope systems. If the
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potential problems associated with such a decision. As one French source
stated: "When the U.S. Navy builds a series of ships it builds 30; when the
French Navy builds a series, it builds 6."[Ref. 55] The French Navy cannot
afford to man and procure duplicate engineering systems to put in land-based
test sites to replicate and investigate fleet engineering problems. The French
Navy intends to proceed slowly in its attempt to push the envelopes of
equipment maintenance. NAVSSES investigates these envelopes for the U.S.
Navy and makes recommendations on whether to shift the envelopes. An
alternative for the French Navy is to work with the U.S. Navy and compare
envelopes for similar equipment. Sharing this information could lead to cost
savings for both navies.
How far to push the limits of the envelope in order to widen the period
between IPERs is the dilemma facing the French Navy today. The placing of
vibration-monitoring equipment aboard ships is a very positive step in the
right direction. Vibrations have a definite measurable effect on operating
machinery. Unfortunately, the French Navy is only in the experimental
stages in this field. It is, in fact, still in the process of evaluating which
vibration monitoring equipment should be procured and installed. The
short-term cost of obtaining and installing the equipment is large
(approximately 85,000FF ($15,455) per unit), but the long-term effect should be
an increase in the equipment life cycle [Ref. 56].
U.S. Navy tried to exend its IPER intervals, NAVSSES would be deeply
involved because its function is to provide comprehensive in-service
(shipboard) engineering support to operating forces.
30
The computerized recording of historical data such as vibration and
equipment casualty for use in correlation and predictions is in the embryonic
stage. There is currently no central data bank established for gathering this
information. Individual commands such as the SCMN at Brest are
purchasing their own personal computers in order to begin tracking this
information. They are taking only minor steps to contact other SCMNs to try
to gather and correlate information, but this needs to be a Navy-wide process.
The SCMN organization throughout the Navy needs to be reviewed, and
standardized procedures developed, in order to streamline the exchange of
information.
The political decisions to conduct the Aviso A69 IPER at Lorient and to
award shipbuilding contracts to civilian rather than naval shipyards have had
an impact on naval long-range budget planning. While the Aviso A69 IPER
could cost more than what was originally programmed, 24 and the
construction contracts could produce a budget savings, the budget savings in
the construction account may not be enough to offset the under-utilization of
government-owned naval shipyards. The DCN had hoped to use the Aviso
A69 IPER in the two shipyards to fill in the gaps between larger projects.
Although the cost/benefit results of saving civilian industry over
government industry will never be known, the French Navy on the surface
appears to have come out ahead. In a four year time span the Navy will have
24The total costs are still unknown. While the French Navy hopes the
centralizing the equipment in one shipyard will produce savings, the POE
fixed costs and subcontractor variable costs that will be associated with fewer
projects at Brest and Toulon may actually produce a deficit.
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six new fregates de surveillance, a feat the DCN at Lorient would have had
difficulty in accomplishing. [Ref. 57 and 58]
In 1991 or 1992 the Assemblee Nationale is expected to a discuss the new
loi de progranimation presenting the new military construction plan for the
next five years. Although privately French sources agree that a second
nuclear aircraft carrier is needed, no official decision has yet been made. The
decision needs to be included in the new loi de programmation if the Navy is
to have a chance of retiring the Foch by the year 2005 (at which time the Foch
will be 42 years old). World events, such as the war in the Persian Gulf, have
reinforced the desirability of maintaining a two aircraft carrier fleet. [Ref. 59]
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III. CHANGING REQUIREMENTS, CHANGING RESOURCES: THE
CHALLENGE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE MODERN
FRENCH NAVY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter, which focuses on methods used or contemplated by the
French Navy to deal with the limitations the 1990s will bring in the area of
personnel management, will necessarily touch on some of the same areas
covered in the second chapter, but the primary focus is on the labor side, Li
and L2 of the production function.
The intrinsically competitive nature of recruitment not only influences
personnel management policies but at the present time is affecting everything
from hardware design to long range strategic planning in the armed forces.
The military is in competition with the private sector for its recruits (LI).
While this situation presents the same basic challenges to the French military
as a whole, each branch of the Armed Forces must decide individually how to
cope with the ramifications of economic and political realities beyond its
control.
The Navy has maintained a steady input of recruits but has problems
reenlisting first term personnel, a failure that imposes grave financial
burdens due to the high cost of training. Unfortunately, recruitment itself
will become a greater problem in the 1990s due to a noteworthy decline in the
birth rate. If the Navy is unable to maintain a sufficient reenlistment rate, it
will be forced to recruit even more heavily from a dwindling manpower
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resource pool in competition with other branches of the Armed Forces. This
competition has forced the Navy to reevaluate the career (limited and long
term) package it currently offers its personnel. The balance it achieves
between wages and incentives (such as retirement benefits) and its other
budgetary requirements will determine in part its success in managing
personnel.
There is a significant difference in the cost to the Navy between a new
recruit (Li) and a conscript (L2), but there is also a significant difference in the
benefits they receive. This difference is projected to increase, since the length
of service of the less trained, less qualified conscripts will be reduced in 1992
from an already minimal twelve months to ten. Further complicating the
situation is the discussion since the war in the Persian Gulf, of an all-
volunteer force versus a mixed force (professional service personnel (Li) and
conscripts (L2) performing their national military service, or NMS). The
immediate effect of this uncertainty is to discourage possible conscripts in an
age group whose desire to be in the military is already often low. An actual
change would pose tremendous problems for recruitment and financing, as
will become evident. Conscription has its own drawbacks and benefits, and
some of these are discussed below. The next section examines problems
related to professional service personnel (Li). The following section examines
NMS conscription (L2). The last section offers some concluding remarks.
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B. THE BASIC PROBLEM: COPING WITH INTERNAL ATTRITION
WHILE THE "FREE" EXTERNAL LABOR FORCE SHRINKS
1. Rationale:
The end strength of the French Navy in 1991 is composed of 46,197
professional service personnel, 19,098 National Military Service (NMS)
personnel, and 7,130 civilian employees. The Navy makes up 10.8 percent of
the total French military force. [Ref. 601 But major problems face the Navy in
the recruitment of personnel, both professional and NMS. The number of
available French men of draft age is decreasing and is expected to bottom out
at a level of 355,000 by 1996. In fact the highest number of available 20 year
olds between the years 1991 and 2006 will occur in 2001. In that year the
expected pool of available men will be 397,000 and the actual pool will be
284,000. 25 The average age of men entering NMS is 20 years and 7 months. In
1989 the actual pool was 298,000 and the French military enlisted 10,338 new
recruits and 251,316 NMS personnel. [Ref. 61] The French Navy needs 3,078
new professional recruits per year. (In 1990, 336 of the professional recruits
came from personnel completing their NMS.) Ten percent is the norm for
enlistments from NMS personnel. [Ref. 621
2. Reenlistments
The French Navy has been having problems getting first term
personnel to reenlist. The qualified recruit is offered an initial enlistment
^The available pool is based on the number of births twenty years earlier.
The actual pool starts with the available pool figure and subtracts the number
of personnel expected to be exmpt from NMS for reasons of health, family,
unusual circumstances, or prior enlistment in the military. Minimum age
for NMS is 18, and service can be delayed until age 23.
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contract of three years or five years, depending on his initial aptitude
examinations. Those with the higher initial aptitude scores receive a first
enlistment contract of five years. This contract is too short, in the view of
some officers in the French Navy. An enlistee can spend up to a year of his
first enlistment in naval schools. He attends seven weeks of operator
training related to the operation of basic navy equipment. This training is
called the Brevet Elementaire (BE) and it is taught at the Centre d'Instruction
Naval (CIN) at Saint-Mandrier. Upon completion of the course, the recruit is
stationed aboard fleet units for two years. After gaining some fleet experience,
he returns to Saint-Mandrier for seven months of technician training. This
type of training, called the Brevet d'Aptitude Technique (BAT), teaches Third
Class Petty Officers (3/C POs) the basics of equipment maintenance and
elementary troubleshooting. On a three year enlistment contract a person is
guaranteed BE training; the five year contract guarantees BE and BAT
training. 26 Between the training and leave periods of a five year contract, the
sailor is effectively non-operational for a whole year. Moreover a large part of
the remaining four years is spent gaining competence. This does not permit
the Navy to get more than a minimal return on its investment.
Furthermore, the French Navy has concluded that the present short
length of service actually encourages people to leave. Reenlistment at the
end of a five year contract brings with it three to four more years at sea;
26 If a person under a three-year contract does well, at the end of his
contract he can ask to reenlist and attend BAT training.
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whereas some marketable skills acquired in the Navy can bring a larger
paycheck in the civilian sector. (See Appendix F.)
Marketable skills are divided into two categories, non-transferable
and transferable. Non-transferable skills are defined as those that apply only
to the military (with very few opportunities in the civilian market). The
military does not need to provide the same level of incentives to retain
personnel holding these skills because there is no real alternative for these
individuals. They either stay in the military and use their skills or quit and
begin training to learn new marketable skills. For example, in the U.S.
Navy's Selective Reenlistment Bonus27 (SRB) system an individual whose
skill is guns (Gunnersmate Guns—GMG) is only eligible for the award once
during his career. This happens between the 21 months and 6 years active
service mark (Zone A) and it has the lowest multiple (1). This is usually the
point when an individual elects to attend specialized technical training. The
27 Selective Service Bonus (SRB)—A monetary bonus given to
individuals when they reenlist in the Navy (but is not part of the
reenlistment contract). The amount of money received depends on the
amount of active service time the member has, his skill, and the amount of
time he has agreed to obligate for. There are three zones in which he might
be eligible to receive the award. Zone A occurs between the 21 month and 6
years continuous active service mark, Zone B between the 6 and 10 year mark,
and Zone C between the 10 and 14 year mark. Depending on his skill he may
not be eligible for all three zones. Each year the Navy transmits a message
defining the multiples used for each zone in calculating the exact amount of
award the individual will receive. Each skill has its own multiple for each
zone. [Ref. 63]
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U.S. Navy, by sending him to this training invests the minimum it needs to
in order to keep the individual in the service. 28
Transferable skills are skills marketable in the civilian sector, and the
U.S. Navy must invest in greater incentives for personnel with these skills.
For example Gas Turbine Electricians (GSE) have multiples for Zones A, B,
and C, of 4.0, 4.5, and 3.0 respectively. The U.S. Navy has a hard time keeping
these individuals in the service because there is a large demand for their
skills in the airline industry. In order to entice them to stay, the U.S. Navy
must offer a competitive compensation package.
As was noted in Chapter II, the French Navy makes capital
investments, such as the IPER for the Aviso A69, in order to extend the
service life of her ships. For the same reason the Navy must invest in its
"human" capital. This investment can be more costly to the French Navy
because it cannot be promptly replaced like an engine on a ship. It takes a
considerable amount of resources (monetary, human, time) to train an
individual to meet certain skill requirements. Once he is able to meet them,
the French Navy needs him to utilize that skill level for a period of time at
least long enough to train another individual to take his place.
As indicated in Appendix (G) on Career Profiles, the age limit for the
Maitre Principal (equivalent to a U.S. Navy Senior Chief Petty Officer—SCPO)
28There are skills that are not readily transferable but still require
continued investment because the Navy does not have enough personnel to
fill required billets. The Boiler Technician (BT) skill is a prime example. This
is not an actively sought job skill by the civilian sector but the Navy pays an
award in all three zones. For Zone A the multiple is 2.5, Zone B 2.0, and Zone
C 1.0. [Ref. 64]
38
and Major (Master Chief Petty Officer—MCPO) will most probably be raised to
keep these highly skilled individuals in the Navy longer. The French Navy
recognizes the need to extend the service careers of its personnel in order to
use their advanced skills in extending the life of its equipment capital.
The need for the Navy to retain its personnel assets is growing ever
more urgent, for the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle will commence its sea
trials in 1996. It will have a ship's complement of 2000 men, and both
commissioned aircraft carriers, the Clemenceau and the Foch, will still be in
service. Thus the need for personnel will certainly grow in the Navy (unlike
the Army and Air Force, which are both facing large reductions in personnel).
At the present time, there is no budgetary provision for the increase in
personnel necessary to man this carrier, so other ships may have to be
decommissioned earlier than scheduled. Another alternative being
considered is to strip other ships down to minimum manning levels. In
either case, the need for qualified personnel will be of utmost importance.
C A REENLISTMENT STRATEGY: THE EIGHT YEAR SYSTEM
A new system is being introduced that has an eight-year first enlistment
contract. At the end of eight years, those evaluated as unsatisfactory for
further naval service will be separated and given a "prime" (comparable to
severance pay) equal to 14 months pay. Personnel will be allowed to quit
between the eight and eleven year mark and receive the "prime." Those
evaluated as satisfactory will be given the opportunity to reenlist for a career.
This will create two career patterns, one of eight years and the other a
minimum of fifteen years. The advantage of the eight year system is that it
eliminates one obstacle in the current reenlistment path.
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In the five year system, an enlistee evaluated as satisfactory at the end of
five years can reenlist for five more years. If he receives average evaluations,
he can only reenlist for 3 years before requesting another reenlistment. The
French Navy judges that an initial enlistment of five years is too short and
makes the first term enlistee think too much about getting out. An initial
term of eight years cuts out the hurdle of the five year mark. [Ref. 65 and 66]
There are disadvantages to the eight year system. This system could cost
the Navy more for two reasons: first, in the new system a Quartier Maitre will
automatically advance to Second Maitre (second class petty officer (2/C PO))
upon successful completion of the BAT29
,
and the difference in sea pay
between a Quartier Maitre and a Second Maitre on a ship homeported in
France is 729 francs ($132) per month; secondly, the French Navy intends to
lower the minimum age limit for Second Maitre and Maitre (First Class Petty
Officer (1 /C PO)) from 45 to 42 to encourage less than "average" personnel to
quit between the eight and eleven year mark.30 If a person reaches his age
29BAT (Brevet d"Aptitude Technique)—elementary technical training
where the individual learns basic skills for machinery maintenance and
minor repairs. [Ref. 67]
3°The French Navy is reducing the age limit because there are not enough
Maitre and Premier Maitre billets in the French Navy. This system helps to
selectively reduce numbers of personnel. This will act as an incentive for
those who made the cuts to stay in the Navy. It is also the French Navy's
intention to raise the maximum age limit for Maitre Principal (Senior Chief
Petty Officer) and Major (Master Chief Petty Officer) from 52 and 55 to 55 and
56 respectively. The maximum age limit is designed for those senior
personnel who reach the lower age limit and want to stay in the Navy. The
Navy can elect to keep the individual until the maximum age limit. The
upper age limit for Second Maitre, Maitre, and Premier Maitre is 50 years of
age. [Ref. 68]
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limit for his particular grade, he can ask to remain in the Navy and the Navy
will review his record and possibly keep him until the maximum age limit
for his grade. If the Navy does not approve his request, he will be obliged to
resign. As mentioned earlier, those leaving between the eight and eleven
year mark will receive a "severance" pay. This pay is a lump sum payment
equal to his base pay for 14 months and is awarded to help the individual
reintegrate into the civilian sector. For Premier Maitre (Chief Petty Officer)
the minimum age limit will be raised from 45 to 47 to keep these highly
trained technical personnel in the service longer. [Ref. 69 and 70]
D. IMPROVING THE MILITARY'S STANDARD OF LIVING
The basic Navy pay scale is too low and the extra benefits too haphazard
(or living and working conditions too onerous) to encourage enlistment.
Personnel in the Navy receive extra pay depending on their stationing. An
unmarried Quartier Maitre (Third Class Petty Officer—3/C PO) has a base pay
of 4,523 francs ($822) per month. He receives a monthly sea pay of 1,131 francs
($205) if he is stationed in France, 1,735 francs ($315) if in the Antilles, and
3,150 francs ($573) if in Djibouti. These are but a few of the examples of the
difference in pay based on homeport.[Ref. 71]
It is difficult for a Quartier Maitre to go from sea duty to shore duty
(especially if he is thinking of getting married and starting a family). This is
an oversimplification, but the problem is real, and young families with fewer
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than three children31 , have a difficult time surviving when the husband loses
sea pay.[Ref. 73]
Since march 1991 the minimum wage (or salaire minimum
interprofessonel de croissance (SMIC)) in France is 31.94 francs/hour
($5.81).[Ref. 74] In order for a civilian to make 5,654 francs ($1,028) per month
he would have to work 44 hours per week. If a sailor's normal workday
begins at roll call (0730) and finishes at 1700, he works 47.5 hours in a five day
work week. However, if one takes into account duty nights, weekend duty,
and holiday duty, plus service 24 hours a day when underway, as well as the
fact that being in the military means that one is always on call in an
emergency, it is apparent that the Quartier Maitre does not get paid the
minimum wage.
The defense budget for 1991 shows that the French government realizes
that it must try to raise the standard of living for the military. The hi de
finances for 1991 earmarks 173 billion francs ($31.5 billion) for just that
purpose. Provisions of special interest to the Navy include:
• a subsidy to compensate for having 24 hours of duty on a Sunday or
holiday (if the person is not given time off as compensation). The
amount earmarked for this program is 168 million francs ($30.54
million). Officers would receive 250 francs ($45), Chief Petty Officers,
First Class Petty Officers (1/C POs), and Second Class Petty Officers (2/C
POs) receive 200 francs ($36), and other enlisted personnel 150 francs
($27).
31There is a large increase in the "allocation familiale" (family allowance)
paid by the government when a couple has a third child. The basic subsidy
paid for two children is 599 francs ($109) per month. With a third child the
sum is 1,368 francs ($249) per month. [Ref. 72]
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• 185 million francs ($34 million) will go towards paying a bonus of five
percent to Chief Petty Officers, 1/C POs, and 2/C POs when they reach 5
years of service.
• 48 million francs ($8.7 million) for 20 percent bonus pay for service in a
war zone.
• the start of an increase to bring the salaries of junior enlisted personnel
(3/C POs, seaman, seaman apprentice, and seaman recruit) up to
minimum wage. The raise will have subtracted from it any bonus,
including the 20 percent bonus of sea pay, to which the person is
entitled (other than those benefits just listed).
It will take substantial financing, 115 billion francs ($20.9 billion) and
seven years to fully implement this plan.[Ref. 75]
E STRATEGIES TO MINIMIZE PERSONNEL SHORTFALLS
The French Navy projects a shortfall of 1300 enlisted personnel in 1996.32
Studies are underway to find a way to minimize the effect of this deficit on
the fleet. One strategy, successful in Brest and currently under evaluation in
Toulon, is the shore-based, exterior-maintenance team mentioned in Chapter
II, for the most part made up of national military service personnel, under
the direction of a squadron commander. Materials (paint, chipping hammers,
etc.) are supplied by the Majorite Generale.
When a Captain knows that his ship will be in port for at least a two-week
period, he can request this team from the squadron. The unit only works on
exterior maintenance (chipping and painting). This allows the ship's
company to concentrate on higher level mechanical maintenance.
32This is based on having "three" aircraft carriers in 1996, the Foch,
Clemeanceau, and the pre-commissioning manning for the Charles de
Gaulle. This problem is also projected to exist in the year 2003 with the Foch,
Charles de Gaulle, and the second nuclear aircraft carrier.
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A study, requested by the Etat-Major de la Marine and conducted by Ecole
de Guerre, looked into the possibility of separating operators and technicians
into two separate "corps." The operators would be assigned to sea billets;
technicians would be shore-based. This system has two major drawbacks:
first, as operators would spend the majority of their time at sea, it would
prove costly to entice a person to stay in the Navy if he knew that virtually
his entire career would be spent at sea; secondly, a ship underway developing
even minor equipment problems would be required to return to port for
repairs. At present operators are also trained as technicians, so "minor"
repairs are handled at sea. The conclusion the study drew is that this
particular system would not be beneficial to the Navy. It is therefore no
longer under consideration. [Ref. 76 and 77]
As noted in Chapter II, the French Navy is in the process of developing a
technical assistance team to help with the minimum manning problem
aboard ships. This team will be shore-based and composed of technically
competent senior enlisted petty officers. Commanding Officers will obtain
assistance from the team by requesting them from the Majorite Generate via
their chain of command. This team is programmed to be operational in 1992.
1. Retirement
In the French Navy an enlisted man can retire from the Navy with 15
years of service and receive his retirement salary at once. (If an officer retires
at the 15 year mark, he will not begin to collect his retirement until he is 50
years old. If he retires with 25 years of service, he starts to collect it at once.)
Retirement pay is a percentage of base salary; the actual percentage is
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calculated using a system of "annuites." The number of annuities the officer
or enlisted man receives depends on his duty station and tasks.
1 year of service on shore = 1 annuite
1 year of service on a ship = 1.5 annuite
1 year of service overseas = 2 annuites
1 year of service on a submarine = 3 annuites
1 year of service on aircraft = 3 annuites
The maximum number of annuites a person can receive is 40, which
equals 80 percent of his base salary for retirement purposes. This is paid in
monthly installments.
An enlisted man stationed on submarines for most of his 15 years can
retire after 15 years with 80 percent of his pay. This system encourages highly
skilled personnel in the critical areas of submarines and naval air to retire
while still young to begin a second career, and it makes it difficult to keep
vital trained personnel in the Naval service. [Ref. 78 and 79]
Debates have begun in France concerning the retirement system for
civil service workers. At the present time there is a movement to equalize all
of the various retirement systems for French government workers.
Currently, civil service workers cannot receive their retirement benefits until
they are 50 years old, so equalization would put an end to enlisted men
receiving benefits immediately following their 15 years of service.[Ref. 80]
2. National Military Service
President Mitterrand announced on July 14, 1990 that the length of
conscription for national military service (NMS) would be changed in 1992
from twelve months to ten months. This came as a surprise to the Minister
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of Defense, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, who only the day before had expressed
some reservations about changing the system. The reduction, he felt, would
cause a deficit in the forces if it were not covered by an increase of 30,000 long
service volunteers (VSL).33 One reason for this is to cover those periods
where very few people volunteer for NMS. 34 "One can presume that the
rapid conclusion of the Soviet/German negotiations, accomplished without
Allied consultations, favored the definition of decisions by certain politicians
who had long had such ideas in their files—that is, to reduce the length of the
national service and the size of the army." [Ref. 81]
National military service was first created in 1798 but was abandoned
during the 19th century. Although it was back on the books in 1872, it did not
become national conscription until 1905. It was then, and continues today, to
be a subject of discussion. [Ref. 82] At present the effort is to make NMS more
attractive. The French have already added a new benefit package, and some
forms of alternative civil service are under consideration. The projected
lengths of service are: ten months for the military, twelve months for the
police and gendarmerie, and eighteen to twenty-four months for voluntary
33Long Service Volunteers (Volontaires pour un Service Long) (VSL) are
personnel who instead of serving for the normal 12 month period, volunteer
to stay for an extra 4 months to a year.
34Traditionally a person completes the school year in June and then
vacations during July and August. In September the conscript reports to
begin his NMS. He completes his NMS twelve months later and then is
available to join the civilian work force. Since the NMS system permits a
conscript to choose the date he begins his NMS, it is expected that he will still
choose September. The ten month system has him finishing in early July
with no expected relief. Therefore, the military is depending on the number
of VSLs increasing to fill the gap.
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civil service overseas. The civil service system would permit teachers to
continue teaching, and student airline pilots to continue training and then go
onto reserve status. Different thresholds of physical aptitude would allow
some men to be considered for technical and administrative duties. This plan
has not yet been approved by either the President or the National
Assembly. [Ref. 83]
The benefit package being offered to the conscripts is as follows:
• A discharge payment (or severance pay) of 350francs ($64) at the end of
NMS.
• Free transportation on the TGV (train a grande vitesse—rapid train)
• Salaries for the VSL raised from 1,400 francs ($255) to 2,100 francs ($382)
per month.
A negotiation now occurs between a future conscript and the
Direction Centrale du Service National (DCSN). 35 A feature of the benefit
package for the 1990s will permit the future conscript to submit a preference,
ranking in order:
• When he will serve.
• Where he will serve.
• What type of job he will have.
The DCSN plans to have a comprehensive information system in
place by 1995 to let future conscripts know which jobs will be available. They
will then be able to reserve a spot, much as they now reserve a seat on trains.
The minister hopes to increase the number of VSL personnel from 20,000 to
40,000 by increasing their pay to 3,000 francs ($545). [Ref. 84]
35DCSN is the office that manages the National Military Service for the
French government.
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The Navy projects that a ten-month NMS will result in increased
costs. It bases that conclusion on the following figures:
• At present, a 17 percent attrition rate means the Navy must recruit
19,300 men to fill 16,500 NMS billets.
• Assuming that the number of billets remains constant, the new ten-
month conscription will force the Navy to recruit 23,200 conscripts
each year. This is an increase of 3,900 conscripted (L2) required to cover
the two month reduction in service.
• The length of service reduction plus the 3,900 man increase will
produce added costs for:
Social Services /Health Benefits36 25.1 million francs($4.6M)
Recruit Training (3,900 X 7,000FF) 27.3 million francs($4.9M)
Severance Pay (3,900 X 350FF) .1 million francs ($.2M)
Clothing/Food (3,900 X 3,500FF) 13.5 million francs($2.5M)
Total Cost 67.0 million francs(12.2M)
This is a significant increase in a time of fiscal constraints. [Ref. 86]
The announcement by President Mitterrand on 14 July 1990 makes it
difficult for the DCSN to manage NMS resources. The available pool of
eighteen-year-olds is currently constrained, and by law the DCSN cannot call
up people younger than eighteen. There are concerns that many eligible
young men will try to put off their military service until the ten-month
obligation becomes law. Should this scenario come to pass, the financial
36When a person enlists in the French military, the first twelve months
of service count as his NMS obligation and he is paid as a conscript. At the
end of his NMS he begins his military "career" and receives the salary of an
enlisted man. A reduction from twelve mths to ten months would have him
complete his NMS two months earlier; therefore his "costs" to the military
would begin two mths earlier. [Ref. 85]
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burden to the military will be greatly increased. The number of VSL's will
have to be increased, and those enlisting in the military will start to receive
their benefits two months earlier. In addition, the projected savings brought
about by decreasing the end strengths of the armed forces (by approximately
30,000) will not be enough to make up for the increased costs of the VSLs and
earlier active-service pay to the first term enlistees. [Ref 87]
From 1982 to 1989 the number of first term enlisted personnel in the
French military decreased fifty percent (from 20,750 to 10,340). The number of
VSLs decreased twenty-four percent between 1986 and 1989. [Ref. 88] While
the Navy had some fluctuation between 1985 and 1989, overall there was a
significant decrease in VSLs during this period. This decrease makes it
difficult to count on the VSLs to make up for the lack of NMS personnel a ten
month system will bring about.37
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Professional First Term Enlisted 2616 1774 1976 1928 2897
Long Service Volunteers (VSL) 3625 2504 2077 2271 1489
The number of first term enlisted is approximately the same in 1985
and 1989, but the number of VSLs is half. [Ref. 89] If the required number of
first term enlisted remains constant and the VSL downward trend continues,
the Navy will be forced to increase NMS recruits. Increasing the number of
first term personnel, however, would require a greater increase in the budget
than increasing the number of VSLs.
37The Navy attributes the decrease to a lack of an active recruiting effort.
It is trying to change and make VSL recruiting a priority.
49
Although the projected population resource pool for recruits and
NMS personnel will decrease, the levels are projected to remain high enough
not to affect either the enlistment or NMS conscription pool enough to hurt
Navy recruiting. During the 1970s the birth rate in France declined
dramatically. 434,000 males were born in 1971; 355,000 in 1976. It is this pool
that is coming of age for NMS.[Ref. 90] The number of projected recruits is
estimated to be 10,000 per year and the number of personnel that will be
excused from NMS (for social reasons) is approximately 20,000 per year.
Subtracting this 30,000, even in 1996 when the 1976 generation turns 20 (the
mean age for NMS), will leave a large enough resource pool to draw from
(325,000) considering that in 1989 the budgeted number of NMS personnel
fixed by the loi de finances was 251,316.
3. The Question of an All-Volunteer Force
A poll conducted for the French Military Information Service
(Service d'Information et de Relations Publiques des Armees—SIRPA), by the
SOFRES polling organization, in 1989 asked the question: "Could France
defend herself without the national military service?" Sixty percent of the
people responded "no" and thirty four percent said "yes."[Ref. 91] This,
according to the SIRPA, has been the belief since 1975.38 Le Point magazine
conducted the following poll in March 1991 with the following results:
^The poll was conducted from 1 to 6 June 1990 by SOFRES. A nationwide
sample of 1008 people 18 years of age and older was taken. Of the sample 47.5
percent was male and 52.5 percent female. The sample population was
categorized by sex, age, profession of the head of the household, and region of
the country based on population density. [Ref. 92]
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In a similar March 1989 poll, 62 percent of the people polled preferred
the system of the all-volunteer force. [Ref. 93]
The SIRPA and Le Point polls ask leading questions and give no
alternatives. The question that has not been raised is: "Do you support paying
for an all-volunteer force?" Since the Gulf War, most French newspapers
have been questioning the utility of having a national military service, but
only discreetly discussing the cost associated with the alternative.
At the outset of the Persian Gulf war, President Mitterrand decided
that only the professional military would participate in combat operations.
This decision, that no personnel involved in their NMS would be sent to the
Persian Gulf, created problems for the military. According to a French official
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writing under a pseudonym, ". . . conscripts comprise 55 percent of the Army,
26 percent of the Navy, and 37 percent of the Air Force." [Ref. 94] The military
response to the Presidential directive was to offer those conscripts serving in
units being sent to the Persian Gulf an "enlistment" for the duration of the
war.[Ref. 95]
Prior to the war in the Persian Gulf, French ships were considered
"French territory"—meaning that NMS personnel stationed aboard could
serve in war zones because they were still on "French territory." When
President Mitterrand made the announcement to exclude NMS personnel
from participation in the war, it presented the Navy with a serious manning
problem. This announcement affected 1600 NMS personnel in the French
Navy. The Navy was obligated to move its ships out of the war zone while
resolving the situation. The solution was to offer NMS personnel an
enlistment contract for a 3-year obligation—with the caveat that the enlistee
can terminate his contract anytime after he completes his initial NMS
(normally 12 months; 18 months in the case of a VSL). Of the 1600 affected,
822 volunteered and 778 had to be replaced by regular enlisted personnel.
Shore establishments and ships not involved in the conflict were stripped of
personnel to replace the "non-volunteers," thus causing hardships
throughout the Navy. Some equipment casualties occurred because the
regular enlisted personnel were not used to doing the routine work that the
NMS personnel had been trained to do. In addition, some ships were not able
to get underway properly because their transferred enlisted personnel had
been replaced by NMS personnel. [Ref. 96]
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There is one immediate problem the special 3-year contract signed by
NMS volunteers presents, i.e: having no way to determine when the 822 will
terminate their contracts, the Navy has no way to schedule their
replacements. But there is no immediate added financial cost to the Navy; in
fact, the 822 "new" professional personnel should ease recruiting efforts
during the three year period. If, however, the Navy turns down potential
enlistees that would have made the Navy a career, the short run gain might
prove to be a long run loss. [Ref. 97]
Jean Schmitt states that a powerful precedent has been set by not
permitting conscripts into the war zone.
"Francois Mitterrand's unopposed decision not to send conscripts to the
Gulf subjects the military to two irreversible conditions: the totality of
the FAR must consist of only professional military personnel, and there
should be attached to it an easily deployed armored division with its
own logistical support also staffed by professionals.39 And now you have
the design for two Armies: a rapidly deployable mega-FAR staffed by
"pros" for external duties, and an interior army composed mainly of
conscripts. [Ref. 98]
Since the changes in Eastern Europe and the outbreak of the Persian
Gulf War, it has become clear that a future war is more likely to involve
defending overseas interests rather than the French homeland. Thus, with 55
percent of the army composed of conscripts, the "two army" concept seems
39FAR (Force d'Action Rapide)—a strong professional force made up of
47,000 to 54,000 men divided into five division. The FAR can participate
directly in the defense of France and can work with France's allies in times of
crisis in Europe in a conventional war. In addition the FAR can be called
upon to represent France overseas and to safeguard France's interests in times
of peace. It is essentially an Army rapid deployment force. [Ref. 99]
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unworkable. But in order to really comprehend the problem that an all-
volunteer force poses, the costs must be examined.
Each year there are 250,000 conscripts in the French military. The
average cost of a conscript is 17,500 FF ($3,182), yielding a total bill to the
country of 4.38 billion francs ($800 million). The average cost of a first-term
enlistee is 150,000 FF ($27,273). Taking the 250,000 billets and converting them
into recruits, yields a cost of 37.5 billion francs ($6.8 billion). And this total
does not even consider the cost increases that would be required to make the
military attractive enough to recruit the necessary personnel. [Ref. 100]
A quick look at the all-volunteer British military shows the huge
costs that can be incurred. Currently there are only 10,000 new enlisted
recruits per year in the French military, and their salary is below minimum
wage. The British military must recruit 27,000 personnel each year to
maintain a total endstrength of 305,000 men. British military personnel
receive higher salaries and incentive pay than do their French counterparts.
Additional monthly pay is given to specialized British personnel such as
Army Airborne and Navy SEALs. This pay varies between the equivalent of
6,300 francs ($1,145) for a private to 10,000 francs ($1,818) for a corporal. The
French have calculated that even if officer and enlisted salaries were to
remain the same, the budget increase required in TITLE III to pay the salaries
and social benefits for an all-volunteer military would be 11.5 billion francs
($2.1 billion). They further estimate an additional cost to the Navy and Air
Force of 600 million francs ($109 million) to pay for the amelioration of living
conditions. (The cost increase for the Army would be covered by the greater
reduction in forces.) Changing to an all-volunteer force would yield certain
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savings, such as eliminating the railway (SNCF) expenditure of 1.1 milliard
francs ($200 million), but the changeover is estimated to have a minimum
overall cost of 11 milliard francs ($2 billion). This is 5.7% of the defense
budget for 1991, and 12 % of TITLE m.[Ref. 101]
The French Navy's TITLE III account (which includes salaries, health
benefits, and maintenance and upkeep), as a percentage of the total Navy
budget, increased slightly from 1990 to 1991 from 35.9 percent to 36.61 percent
(before the transfer of 540 million francs ($98.2 million) for upkeep from
TITLE HI to TITLE V). The Operations and Maintenance (O&M) account also
rose 1.5 percent between 1990 and 1991. The problem, as discussed in Chapter
II, is that the overall cost of repairs also continues to rise, preventing the
French Navy from dedicating sufficient funds for maintaining or upgrading
habitability in its fleet. Living conditions are very important in maintaining
morale; and a continuation of this trend will not support a good recruiting
program for the Navy, especially when the armed forces are faced with cuts in
service lengths for conscripts and the possibility of an all-volunteer force.
4. The Hidden Costs of Conscription
The introduction to the thesis discussed the production function (Q),
stating that it is dependent on three variables: capital (K), professional service
labor (Li), and conscription labor (L2). This conscripted labor, normally
thought of as free labor, actually has real, but often hidden costs associated
with it.
Each year the lot de finances budgets for approximately 250,000 NMS
personnel. This large and highly diverse group ranges from those who lack
job skills to those, such as engineers, with high job skill qualifications. While
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those lacking job skills actually benefit by being in the military (and if an
individual does well, he may request enlistment in the military), the highly
trained must forgo one year of a career for NMS. Their personal loss can also
be a loss to society as a whole, for the individual will most likely not be
working at his optimum level of productivity during NMS (i.e. working in
the field of his expertise).
The Direction Centrale du Service National (DCSN) is trying to
minimize the loss of this productivity by offering prospective conscripts a
chance to participate in the decisions about when, how, and where they will
do their military service.
As well as the loss of individual productivity, there are other hidden
costs to NMS. One such cost discussed earlier, under the heading of National
Military Service, is that of the incentives which have to be offered to attract a
greater number of VSLs (L2).
The government hopes to increase L2 in order to make up for the
manning shortfalls of the professional service (Li). In the case of naval
output (Q), increasing either K or Li will increase production. For example, if
the Navy spends more money on ship upkeeps (K), it will extend the life of
the ship, as will increasing the number of long-term professional service
personnel (Li) who are more experienced with the maintenance of the
equipment. However increasing L2 much beyond the present level may
actually cause production to decline. Although on the surface L2 appears to be
"free," in fact it can be a liability to the military. Too many short-term
untrained people cause the military to spend more L] resources on training
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and (in the case of NMS one year conscripts) on finding meaningful tasks for
these individuals.
The Navy has two basic problems: the rising cost of
construction/repairs and a lack of enlisted personnel. These two problems
are important factors in any decisions involving long or short range
programs. For example, the Floreal class of ships is built under civilian
(SOLAS) regulations and uses a minimum manning concept (i.e. to automate
as much equipment as possible in order to reduce the required manning
level). In addition, older ships are getting assistance from a mainly NMS
shore-based exterior-hull maintenance team (and in 1992 the shore-based
technical-repair-assist team). Generally there appears to be a substitution of K
and L^for Li.
When projects such as the hull maintenance team are decided upon,
little or no consideration is given to alternative sources of labor as long as
NMS provides a cheap labor supply. Yet how effective is the hull
maintenance team? Is there, in fact, another alternative to using this
supposedly "free" labor force that could still achieve the same objective?
This team is composed primarily of NMS personnel with
professional service enlisted men responsible for them. Chipping and
grinding a ship's hull, then smoothing, and finally priming and painting the
area is very labor-intensive work. A conscript who perhaps did not
"voluntarily" enter NMS duty, with his "benefits" being only food and
shelter, is probably not going to be very productive. Is this the most efficient
(in the sense of the correct mix of resources to produce optimum readiness)
system for the Navy to use? This system requires Li to manage and motivate
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L2 at a time when the French Navy is experiencing shortfalls in recruitment
and reenlistment.
An alternative to using NMS personnel is to contract out the work to
a civilian firm. In the long run more work may be accomplished in a shorter
amount of time, thereby increasing the overall longevity of the ships. (This
frees Li to fill the manning gaps in other areas of the French Navy). The
overall cost savings in terms of releasing L] personnel to more productive
pursuits and extending ship life times might offset the cost of contracting out
the work. The counter-proposal can be phrased as a question: "Why contract
out when there is 'free' labor available to do the work? After all, ships will
always need exterior upkeep and conscripts need to be employed."
But one possible benefit to the ongoing discussions of an all-
volunteer service is that everything hitherto taken for granted has been put
into question, and considerations such as the cost-effectiveness of NMS labor
might get a totally new evaluation.
F. CONCLUSION
The maintenance of a high reenlistment rate is crucial to the
survivability of any military establishment, for the costs of recruiting and
training are high, and the military needs to get the most out of its
investment. A short initial contract, which discharges a recruit just when he
has learned his trade, gives the military no more than a minimal benefit
from its investment and in fact encourages the military not to invest as
heavily in its personnel. This leads to more capital intensive defense
production. However, to maintain a high reenlistment rate, the
compensation package offered by the Navy must be competitive with that
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which the enlisted man can obtain on the outside. The package must also be
tailored to meet the Navy's manning levels so that at certain intervals there
are sufficient personnel who leave the Navy to prevent it from becoming too
"top-heavy." The current practices—including (a) not devoting sufficient
funds for upgrading habitability and (b) paying new recruits less than the
minimum wage—does not entice enough to stay in the Navy.
The idea of creating a longer initial contract is a positive move towards
solving the reenlistment problem. If the Navy is able to keep a person for
eight years, the chances of getting him to reenlist are increased. With the
incentive offered between the eight and eleven year mark, the Navy hopes to
assure itself of having enough personnel for the number of billets it will have
open. Depending on the particular program, some enlisted personnel can
retire after fifteen years of professional service. Unfortunately, this
retirement system appears to encourage skilled personnel to leave and start
new careers.
The current debates on national military service are quite heated. The
utility of the system sometimes appears questionable when one considers the
implications of taking young men out of the civilian work force for a year to
work in areas other than those for which they have been training. This
system yields less than optimum productivity for society as a whole. But as a
budgetary question for a country that wants to maintain global presence, the
national military service has some merit. Given that France wants to
maintain her current military capabilities, the cost of doing away with a "free"
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labor force and paying new recruits to take their place would be substantial.40
Even the reduction in 1992 from twelve months to ten months is going to be
quite costly. But political considerations and public sentiment will also play a
role in the decision. Michel Rocard, the Prime Minister in 1988-1991,
expressed the Socialist party's egalitarian philosophy and referred to the
national interest when he stated: "The tradition of a conscripted army is very
strong in France, and the country would lose a lot if it were renounced."[Ref.
102]
^Exactly how substantial the cost would be depends on exactly how much
Li is paid. Remember L] and Li have very different paybacks. If, for example,




A. PRESENT PERFORMANCE AS AN INDICATION OF FUTURE
RESULTS
In an attempt to assess the French Navy's resource management policies
and its ability to meet global military missions in the future, this thesis has
examined the critical areas of shipboard maintenance and personnel
management. The economic model of a production function was adopted as
a useful framework for discussion. Naval output (defined as readiness to
accomplish military missions) was assumed to depend on two primary
resource inputs, physical capital (ships, fuel, maintenance parts, etc.) and labor
(professional service and conscripts).
Chapters II and III survey the problems currently faced by the French
Navy in trying to manage these resources under existing budgetary
constraints. It is clear that the French Naval establishment is aware of the
vital importance of these areas and has taken steps to devise novel and
effective strategies to blend the two inputs. The Navy's willingness to
innovate and constantly reassess policies regarding capital and personnel
input combinations bodes well for the future.
The recent performance of the French Navy indicates flexibility and an
ability to tackle and overcome problems. A static or straight line projection
from the present situation might therefore be misleading. The situation is far
from static. Due in part to the uncertainty about the future of conscription, or
national military service (NMS), all programs are being reevaluated. What
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follows is a summation of the present situation as it relates to the specific
questions raised in the introduction.
a. The French Navy is likely to continue to extend the time lag between
IPERs to the extremes of the equipment envelopes (the maximum
point before damage occurs). The long term effect is unknown. By
dropping unnecessary (and destructive) routine maintenance,
equipment life could be extended and long-term cost savings achieved.
Short-term cost savings will be achieved through the reduction of man
hours sacrificed to unnecessary maintenance. Everything depends on
the ability of the Navy to determine how much maintenance is
"necessary." Moreover, this program suffers from a significant
drawback since the French Navy does not have a system of
computerized equipment tracking that permits it to easily know what
has happened to the equipment and produce real time tracking
information. Almost everything is done manually. The lack of
coordination between verification and maintenance activities will
prevent the Navy from realizing potential cost savings by correlating
problems in ships of the same class or problems with the same type of
equipment.
b. TITLE HI funds have remained steady for the last two years and are not
scheduled to be reduced further, but the O&M accounts in TITLE III
will have less and less buying power as the cost per project from the
DCN continues to increase. These costs will leave less money for the
Navy to spend on personnel compensation such as habitability. The
older the French fleet becomes, the more habitability upkeep costs
increase. This could have a damaging effect on crew morale and could
hinder recruiting and reenlistment, making the Navy more dependent
on NMS personnel at a time when the Navy needs to increase enlisted
personnel in order to man the ships presently being constructed. It
must be added, however, that the hi de finances for 1991, which
earmarks 1,729.824 million francs ($314.51 million) to increase military
benefits, shows that the French government realizes that it must try to
raise the standard of living for the military.
c. At the present time it appears that the French Navy will face
difficulties in meeting all of its upcoming manning requirements. No
increase in personnel has yet been authorized to help with the
manning of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, which begins sea
trials in 1996. The same issue will arise again for the second nuclear
aircraft carrier in the years 2002/2004.
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B. PROBLEM AREAS DEFINED; RECOMMENDATIONS
It is always difficult for individuals brought up in one culture to
understand fully what goes on in another culture. American ways are not
French ways. The French Navy does not function exactly like the U.S. Navy,
nor should it. For example, the difference in size of the two fleets warrants a
very structured approach to problem solving in the U.S. Navy, while the
French Navy can rely on more on ad hoc solutions. Cultural differences also
come into play in the reliance on different methods of problem solving. For
example, from an American point of view, it appears that the French Navy's
innovative strategies to obtain a more cost-effective Navy could be
jeopardized without steps to improve communication, command oversight,
and coordination of projects.
As an example of coordination and communication difficulties on a
higher level, two recent political decisions have had an enormous impact on
the French military and seem to have been made without consultation with
the military hierarchy. During the Persian Gulf crisis President Mitterrand
made the decision not to send conscript personnel into the war zone. His
decision necessitated a large amount of reorganization and improvisation in
the military at a time of impending war. According to published French
sources, for the Navy this decision meant pulling ships out of the Gulf,
restructuring the manning aboard all naval units that would be sent (i.e.
substituting L] for L2), and effectively preventing some ships from getting
underway due to a lack of qualified personnel.
The Presidential decision has also set a precedent which seems, at the
present time, to necessitate either the establishment of additional professional
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military units suitable for overseas operations or a change to an all-volunteer
force. Either of these transitions would be costly and both are currently being
debated by the Assemblee Nationale.
The second political decision made without military consultation was the
decision to reduce the duration of conscript service from twelve to ten
months. There is a desire on the part of some Socialist politicians to further
reduce the length of service to six months. (The goal of reducing conscript
service to six months has been a declared aim of the Socialist party since 1981.)
It seems that French military authorities are currently uncertain how to
handle the situation. [Ref. 103]
Conscripted labor L2 is considered "free," meaning that the Navy does not
have to pay as much for this labor. The conscript L2 provides some
contribution because he has enough time to learn a skill and then to use that
skill productively. The marginal productivity provided by employing one
more conscript is positive to the extent that he provides some benefit to the
Navy. The same marginal productivity is not provided if the duration of
service is shortened (it may result in negative marginal productivity). A
shorter conscription for some L2 means that there is no longer "free" labor for
the Navy. Gaining one more conscript might actually reduce the output
(readiness) of the Navy, since it will take more of the Navy's (Lj) resources to
"make work" for L2, thereby leading to a reduction in readiness. The high L2
turnover rate will cause Li to spend more time supervising L2, giving Li less
time to work in its own skill areas. In order for this not to affect readiness the
Navy could be compensated in the form of an increase in professional
personnel endstrength. This would allow the French Navy to have enough
64
trained personnel to accomplish both its global missions and the supervise of
conscripts.
Political decisions are often totally beyond the military's influence, but an
important aspect of the naval establishment is potentially more controllable.
The DCN is a semi-autonomous unit, and the lack of free and open
communication channels between the DCN and the Navy leadership seems
to complicate sound management of the Navy's maintenance budget. Given
the current fiscal situation, it would appear desirable for the Navy if DCN
work rules were relaxed. Stronger high level command oversight involving
Navy/DCN projects might also be beneficial.
For example, the awarding of the Floreal class shipbuilding contract to
Saint-Nazaire caused employment problems for the DCN. The DCN's
unwillingness (or perhaps their inability under current work rules) to
displace employees from one shipyard to another (e.g., Lorient to Toulon)
created hardships for the Navy. In particular the Navy was obliged to shift
the Aviso A69 IPERs from their homeports of Toulon and Brest to Lorient in
order to create employment there.
The movement to Lorient caused the Navy to reconsider its resource
management policy to obtain maximum productivity from personnel as well
as proper upkeep for its ships. Crew morale was the catalyst for the changes.
The Navy knew it could not keep its crews away from their families for five
months. Instead, the Navy decided to decrew the ship and to pay the DCN to
accomplish the work originally earmarked for the crew to do during the IPER.
This strategy not only has a monetary cost, but also a cost in terms of a loss of
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"hands-on" historical knowledge of the ship and its equipment, because none
of the men that will crew the ship will be aboard during the IPER.
The monetary cost may be high because the Navy has been unable to
extract exact cost estimates from the DCN. The DCN's costs keep rising (i.e. a
POE's salary is automatically adjusted for inflation) and these costs are
routinely passed on to the Navy. Due to the structure of the repair
contracting system, the Navy is unable to contract out to other firms without
passing through the DCN. The Navy hopes to reduce its costs by centralizing
its operations. It judges that by gathering the equipment and a team of
"experts" in one place to conduct AVISO A69 IPERs, it should reduce overall
costs.
Centralization should be a benefit if all other costs remain constant, but
French sources have already reported that the DCN underestimated the time
required to accomplish the work normally earmarked for the ship's company.
Current DCN costs could be quite different from future DCN costs at Lorient if
the Navy and the DCN do not communicate on what utilization rate is
projected for the shipyard under the current fiscal constraints. The DCN may
ultimately have to show more flexibility by possibly scaling down its work
force to meet the Navy's reduced requirements.
Another example of the effects of a lack of communication between the
two organizations is the Floreal class construction program. Saint-Nazaire
and the DCN were supposed to work closely during the engineering phase in
order to ensure that minimal additional work would be required once the
ship passed from initial construction to weapons-system installation. This
did not happen, and currently the ship is being extensively modified by the
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DCN at Lorient in order to install the weapons systems. The construction
contract at Saint-Nazaire is a fixed cost contract and the DCN Lorient
installation package is a variable cost. Lack of communication between the
two activities means more variable cost hours for the DCN because of cutting
holes and routing cables throughout the ship in order to install the weapons.
Careful communication would have ensured that the holes, cables, and
cableways were already in place when the ship arrived at Lorient. Note,
however that a fixed cost contract by its very nature induces the contractors to
pass on any costs they can get away with.
The third area of potential cost-savings is in the domain of intra-Naval
communications. Greater communication between the various verification
and repair activities would avoid the current duplication of effort and lead to
cost savings. The SCMN organizations may need to standardize the way they
conduct business. For example, although there is a manning shortage at the
SCMN in Toulon, it still conducts its own repairs in order to avoid sending
work to the DCN. This provides a cost savings for the Navy. In contrast, the
SCMN in Brest is fully manned yet does not conduct any repairs. Work in
Brest is accomplished either by the AMF or the DCN.
Secondly, both SCMNs are developing their own programs for tracking
equipment casualties aboard ships in their respective ports. It appears that
they are not communicating with each other to develop a unified system that
would eventually facilitate an exchange of information. The French Navy
might find it advisable to compile and correlate information in computerized
form in order to have real-time data. Having two organizations develop two
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different programs for the same purpose does not support a cost-cutting
r>V» i 1 r»cr\nV> \rphilosophy
C RECOMMENDATION FOR A CLOSER FRENCH/AMERICAN
WORKING RELATIONSHIP
The final area of potential cost savings is that of inter-naval
communications. The French Navy and the U.S. Navy could benefit from a
dialogue regarding administrative sciences and resource management. The
French Navy already communicates with other Western European navies
(such as the British and German Navies) that operate under similar cost
constraints. Establishing direct communication with the U.S. Navy's ships'
life cycle managers, engineering facilities such as NAVSSES, and the
authorities responsible for new construction (Commander, Naval Sea
Systems Command—NAVSEA), should help both navies attempts to get the
longest life at the least cost from their equipment. For example, both the U.S.
Navy and the French Navy are investigating cost/benefits of various
vibration analysis equipment. Each is working separately and spending
money on R&D, duplicating each other's efforts. Working closely on this and
similar problems could yield cost savings to both navies in the future. 41 It is
in the shared security interest of France and the United States that the two
navies work together for the common defense of the Atlantic Alliance.
41One potential roadblock to this inter-naval communication is that it
would involve the French Navy encroaching upon DCN "territory," for all
R&D in the area of shipboard maintenance is supposed to be in the domain of
the DCN, and cost-effective measures discovered through inter-naval contacts
could prove costly to DCN contracts.
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APPENDIX A. VOCABULARY TRANSLATIONS
The following major vocabulary translations are provided for use in
understanding this thesis:
A. IPER (Indisponibilite Periodique d'Entretien et de Reparation)—A ship
is out of service for a period of 1 to 6 months for upkeep or to effect
repairs. The work is accomplished under the direction of the DCN
(defined below) using civilian labor. The U.S. Navy equivalent is SRA
(Ship Repair Availability). [Ref. 104]
B. PEI (Periodes d'Entretien Intermediate)—The ship is dockside for
under one month. If the ship can be gotten underway in less than 72
hours, it is considered operationally available. If not, it is said to be
unavailable for reasons of upkeep. The work is accomplished under
the direction of the AMF (defined below) and uses only military labor.
U.S. Navy equivalent is IMAV (Intermediate Maintenance
Availability). [Ref. 1051
C SCMN (Service de Controle du Materiel Naval)—A unit of
approximately 90 highly technically skilled senior petty officers who
investigate any equipment problems aboard ships and recommend the
corrective action. They are rapid technical troubleshooters.[Ref. 106]
D. AMF (Atelier Militaire de la Flotte)—Career naval shore personnel
who specialize in shipboard repairs. The U.S. Navy equivalent is SIMA
(Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity). [Ref. 107]
E. Majorite Generale—This unit assures the protection, defense, security,
policing, and good order of the base. In addition it coordinates the
various military and civilian management support for the ships. The
unit is responsible for centralizing the work requests and dividing
them amongst the support organizations for accomplishment. This
section is divided into two branches: ship upkeep and ships under
construction (sea trials). The upkeep branch is further subdivided into
hull, machinery & electricity, and weapons. The person who is billeted
to head the Majorite Generale is called the Major General, and he is
normally either a captain or rear admiral. [Ref. 108 and 109]
F. DCN (Direction des Constructions Navales)—Civilian branch of the
defense department (Ministere de la Defense) organization responsible
for naval ship construction and weapon systems. It oversees the naval
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shipyards at Brest, Toulon, Cherbourg, and Lorient. The U.S. Navy
equivalent is SUPSHIP (Supervisor of Shipbuilding). In the area of
shipboard upkeep and maintenance the Director of the DCN works
directly for the Chief of Naval Operations (Chef d'Etat-Major de la
Marine); this is not the case in new construction. Here he works
directly for the Delegation Generale pour l'Armement (DGA) who is
responsible for construction in all of the Armed Forces. [Ref. 110 and
111] (See Figure A-l.)
















Figure A-l. DCN and French Navy Organizational Relationship
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APPENDIX B. U.S. NAVAL READINESS MEASUREMENTS
The U.S. Navy measures combat or mission readiness using several
analytical tools. The first and basic document is the Projected Operational
Environment (POE) and Required Operational Capabilities (ROC), established
for each ship class in the OPNAVINST C3501 series of instructions. The POE
and ROC defines mission areas (e.g., AAW, ASUW, CCC, MOB-E
(engineering mobility), etc.) that the class must be capable of performing.
The U.S. Navy measures the ability of a ship to conduct operations in
each mission area through the SORTS (Status of Resource and Training
System) reporting system. SORTS requires the ship to report combat
(C-l-C-4) and mission (M-l-M-4) readiness.
Combat readiness is measured by a C-rating in each of four resource
categories: Personnel, Supply, Equipment, and Training. Personnel readiness
comes from comparing the number of people in each required rating actually
onboard and their NECs (Navy Enlisted Classifications—skill levels) with
what the manning documents show the ship should have. Manning
documents indicate which ratings a ship is required to have to support a
given mission area. Supply readiness comes from logistics documents
showing, e.g., what spare parts, consumables, ammunition, etc. the ship is
required to carry to be C-l. Equipment readiness reflects equipment casualties
affecting the ability to conduct operations in mission areas. Specific C-ratings
are found in TYCOM (Type commanders—e.g., Commander Naval Surface
Forces Atlantic) instructions dealing with casualty reporting (CASREPS).
Training readiness reflects completion of training exercises within specified
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periodicities. A given mission area, say MOB-E, has a variety of drills,
exercises, trainers, and required schools associated with it, along with
specified training periodicities and numbers of trainer and school graduates
required.
Mission area readiness is then measured using the four C-rating inputs to
determine the M-rating for that mission area.
Combat and Mission readiness C and M-ratings are then combined
through a worksheet procedure. All C and M-ratings plus an overall combat
readiness rating are then reported in the SORTS system. Whenever one or
more of the ratings changes, a new SORTS message must be sent. These
messages are used to brief the TYCOMS three times per week (at least for
surface ships).
This system is very mechanical and as such may not reflect certain
deficiencies. However, a Commanding Officer and or his immediate superior
in the chain of command (ISIC) can subjectively determine whether or not a
ship can meet its operational tasking.
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APPENDIX C. GOVERNMENT PURCHASES
One way to measure Gross National Product (GNP) is through
expenditure on final goods and services during a particular year. The basic
equation is:
Y = C + I + G + (X-M)
where: Y represents GNP
C represents CONSUMPTION (consumer purchases)
I represents INVESTMENT (gross private domestic investment)
G represents GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
X represents EXPORTS
M represents PMPORTS
ASSUMPTION: For purposes of this discussion, suppose the current
account is in balance such that (X-M) is zero (or negligible). Then
Y = C + I + G
Focusing on G, government purchases can be broken down into "non-
defense" purchases (Gnd) (i-e - government administration) and "defense"
purchases (Go) (i.e. the defense budget). This yields:
Y = C + I + GND + GD
The Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF) "is a curve showing all
combinations of goods that can be produced when available resources are
used fully and efficiently." [Ref. 112] This means that if all resources are used
fully, any combination of two goods that are produced is found along the
curve. Assume the two goods can be measured as total non-defense
expenditures (C + I + Gnd) and total defense expenditures (Go)- Then the PPF






Figure C-l. Non-defense and Defense Expenditures
This PPF curve represents the choices to the government and the economy.
Either:
• more can be spent on non-defense (moving to the left on the curve
—
point (a)) leaving less money for defense; or
• less can be spent on non-defense (moving to the right on the curve
point (b)) leaving more money for defense.
If the government finds itself at a point below the curve (at c), it is not
operating efficiently using all available resources. The curve is subject to
shifting outward or inward depending on whether there is an increase or
decrease in available resources or improvements in technology.
Government defense purchases (Go) can be further broken down into
two components, "consumption" (Gd c ) and "investment" (Go 1 )- The
consumption component can roughly be represented by Title III (salaries,
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social benefits, and Operations and Maintenance) of the French defense
budget. The investment component of government defense expenditures are
reflected in Title V (new construction, overhauls, and-in the case of the
French Navy-the strategic nuclear submarines). The new formula for GNP
can be written as:
Y = C + I + GNd + GDC + Gd1
Looking at two components of GNP "consumption" (C + Gd c ) and














Figure C-2. Government Defense Purchases—Consumption and Investment
For a constant amount of C and I, if the government increases defense
consumption (i.e. increases the operating tempo and keep ships at sea thereby
deliberately increasing fuel consumption in the Operations and Maintenance
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account of Title III), it will be at point (a) on the curve. Conversely, if it
decides to invest more (i.e. build more ships, research and development, etc.,
with Title V), it will move to the right along the curve to point (b). This curve
represents the constant fight between Title in and Title V accounts. Given
that the Navy budget stays relatively constant, as one account is increased the
other decreases.
The significance of investment is that it augments the resources available
for both defense (Gd) and non-defense (Gnd) goods and services in the future.
So by sacrificing some present consumption (Gdc ) for investment (Go 1 ), the
gain is greater future production (and consumption) possibilities. Figures C-3,
C-4, and C-5 display shifts in the PPF that occur when consumption (C), and
investment (I), and non-defense expenditures Gnd are held constant and
changes occur in defense consumption (Gdc ) and investment (Go 1 )- Figure
C-3 depicts the case where increasing the amount of defense consumption
(Gd c ) (from a to a') leads to a small, future increase in resources (life
expectancy of ship).
Figure C-4 depicts the case where increasing the amount of defense
investment (Go 1 ) (from a to b) implies spending less on present consumption;
this leads to more resources being available in the future for consumption.
Figure C-5 shows the effect of a technological discovery (e.g., a new
welding process for assembling the hull of a ship) in increasing investment
(Gd 1 ) which is not reflected in an increase in consumption (Gdc )- The French
Navy can also use this curve to explain shifting upkeep funds from Title HI to
Title V in 1989 and 1991. These upkeep funds were used for major





Figure C-3. Increasing Defense Consumption








Figure C-5. Technological Discovery Effect on Increasing Investment
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APPENDIX D. DIRECTION DES CONSTRUCTIONS NAVALES COSTS
This appendix explains in simple, but general, terms the Direction des
Constructions Navales (DCN) costs to the Navy. The basic DCN costs come
from the cost of government workers called POEs (Personnel Ouvrier
d'Etat).42 The formula for calculating the total cost of POE workers is:
TOTAL POE COST = (NUMBER of POEs) X (SALARY per POE)
As an example, if a worker's salary is 115,000FF ($21,000) and there are
5000 workers (the number of POEs at DCN Lorient), the POE COST is
577,500,000FF ($105,000,000).
If the POE's salary increases faster than the rate of inflation (3.4% in 1990),
which according to a French source is in fact the case, the POE COST will be an
even greater share of Navy costs. [Ref. 113 and 114] Given that the French
Navy's budget remains constant, or grows at the rate of inflation (or, worse,
decreases), the POE COST takes up a greater proportion of the Navy budget
and decreases the amount of money the Navy can spend on other projects
(e.g. on maintenance).
The POE COST growth is graphically illustrated in Figure D-l.
Average Fixed Costs (AFC) are calculated by dividing POE COST by the
number of hours of workload. Looking at Figure D-2, as the workload
42This is actually only one part of the DCN cost, because the complete cost
also includes consumption of electricity, DCN building maintenance costs,
and other overhead costs. The total DCN cost is made up of variable costs (i.e.
electricity consumption) and overhead cost (i.e. building rental) and the POE
cost. Overhead and POE costs represent the total fixed costs but this thesis
focuses on the largest fixed component, POE cost.
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(measured in hours) increases, the AFC decreases. The French Navy has been
decreasing the amount of work it is giving to the DCN (W*i to W2) so by
Figure D-2 one can see that the DCN's fixed costs associated with each project
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Figure D-2. Average Fixed Costs (AFC)
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APPENDIX E. A SHIP'S LIFE EXPECTANCY
Does spending more money on maintenance each year increase the life of
a ship? Is it possible to spend less and still achieve the same mission life
expectancy? The historical data which for the French Navy are very







M. M. M, MAINTENANCE 8
YEAR
Figure E-l. The Effect of Increasing the Amount of Maintenance per Year on
the Ship's Life
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The graph in Figure E-l represents two situations:
• increasing the amount of maintenance per year will extend the life of a
ship to a certain point and then any increase will actually decrease the
life of the ship along curve (A).
• increasing the amount of maintenance per year to a certain level will
continuously increase the life of a ship, but with diminishing returns
(curve B).
Curve (A) represents the first situation. The amount of maintenance
conducted in a particular year (calculated as Dollars of Maintenance per year)
is point Mi, which will give a life span of 18 years. Point M2 represents the
maximum ship's life span one can hope to achieve no matter how much
maintenance is conducted. Point M3 represents the ship's life span decrease
that occurs because of the amount of maintenance conducted. If a piece of
equipment is taken apart too often, there is a risk of imposing equipment
failure (e.g., incorrectly reassembling parts or causing damage to close
clearance machinery parts). As the saying goes "if it isn't broken, don't fix it!"
This graph clearly shows that if a Navy determines what life expectancy it
wants from a ship, it can use equipment failure historical data to predict the
amount of maintenance dollars to spend, thus avoiding useless
overspending.
Curve (B) represents the possibility that spending more for maintenance
will actually increase the life of a ship. This too will reach some maximum
point where any additional maintenance dollars expended will neither
increase nor decrease the life expectancy of a ship (whether or not it is cost-
effective on other grounds to spend that amount). Historical data would help
to predict the maximum maintenance dollars to spend to achieve maximum
life for a ship.
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The U.S. Navy is introducing a new concept for extending the life of a
ship. The new concept calls for a ship that will actually have two "service"
lives. The ship is the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class, which will eventually
replace all of the destroyers and cruisers in the U.S. Navy. Its first service life
will be as a Battle Force Combatant (BFC).
The BFC is a multi-mission ship equipped with a phased array radar, an
AEGIS-type battle management system, a vertical launch system of 90-
120 cells, an advanced surface-to-air missile, and an advanced SQQ-89
anti-submarine combat system. [Ref. 1151
This service life will be from commissioning to the 20-year point, at which
time the ship will enter a "new" service life role of Protection of Shipping
(POS). This role will have destroyers (eventually only DDG-51 class) replace
the current frigates in the U.S. Navy.
The POS is also a multi-mission ship but with an emphasis on ASW. It
must have a capable short range AAW system, an ASW system which
provides a high probability of detection at extended ranges, two
helicopters and a quick-reaction vertical launch ASW weapon. [Ref. 116]
This role will have a service life of at least 20 years and possibly beyond. The
key to this is called "Flexible Transition."
This concept assumes that a ship at commissioning is able to meet the
most demanding threat in the BFC role. As the threat increases over
time, the ship's ability to meet its BFC mission degrades. To overcome
this shortfall in the most cost effective manner, older ships in the BFC
force are shifted to the less demanding POS mission at the mid-point of a
40-year expected service life and replaced with new ships in the BFC
force. Although reliability, maintainability, safety, and fact of life repair
and some minimum level of modernization will remain a requirement,
the very expensive backfit of modern combat systems designed to pace
the most demanding threat will not be accomplished. Flexible
Transition reassigns a ship to missions more in keeping with its
capabilities as the ship matures. [Ref. 117]
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This process is not directly applicable to the French Navy because the
number of ships built per class is relatively small (6 for the Florial class); but
it is an alternative that could be explored. Changing the ship's mission at the
mid-point of her expected service life could have an impact on the type and
frequency of maintenance required. As the French Navy continues to build
ships (regardless of the pace), it could place the new ships into the most
arduous roles and shift the others to less demanding assignments.
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APPENDIX F. HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT
Appendix (C) introduced the concept that government defense purchases
(Gd) is broken down into two components "consumption" (Gdc ) and
"investment" (Go 1 )- In the context of human capital, "investment" can be
further broken down into two subcomponents "transferable" (Gtd 1 ) and
"non-transferable" (Gntd 1 ) investment in human capital. Each of these refers
to the skills that are taught by the military that an individual may or may not
be able to readily use in the civilian market.
In the case of "transferable" investment, while the individual enjoys the
benefit of acquiring marketable skills, the problem is that the military must
compete to retain these personnel. Moreover, the military is often more
constrained than private employers in the type of benefit packages it can offer.
This constraint comes from a fixed budget (fixed by an outside organization
—
the government). The military is forced to pay personnel of the same grade,
active service time, and skill level in their various occupational categories the
same wages. In the civilian market an employer can vary the wages paid to
an individual based on competitive market forces in particular occupations.
The military is confronted with the problem that the more it increases an
individual's skills the more he will be marketable outside the military. This
in turn increases the investment cost to the military because it pays for the
training and then must offer a higher rewards package to keep the individual
in the military. One alternative is to increase military pay flexibility to hire
directly in the labor market, eliminating some training costs.
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Non-transferable skills are those skills that an individual learns in the
military that are not readily applicable in the civilian market. As described in
Chapter II, gunnery is a prime example of non-transferable skill. The Navy
will be in the position of a monopsonist in this case, because it is not
concerned with the person taking his skill elsewhere. Since there is no
competition with the civilian market for this individual, the Navy does not
have to offer as attractive a benefits package in order to entice the individual
to stay in the Navy. However, these occupations require that training be
provided almost exclusively by the employer.
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APPENDIX G. CAREER PATH PROFILES
The following career path profiles are currently in the review process for
possible implementation by the French Navy:
• Short Career: (less than 15 years active service)
•• Initial 8 year enlistment contract with a guarantee of attending
BAT43 training. (If the perspective recruit does not have a high
initial aptitude rating he can be offered a 3 year vice 8 year contract).
• • Upon successful completion of the BAT he will be automatically
advanced to Second Maitre (Second Class Petty Officer—2/C PO).
•• Can receive a severance pay (equal to 14 month salary) if the person
quits with 8 to 11 years of active service.
• Intermediate Career: (15 to 21 years active service)
•• Able to retire immediately and begin receiving retirement salary.
•• abandon the system of an upper and lower age limit for career
personnel. Institute a one age limit system.
•• End career when person is about 40 years of age.
• Long Career: (more than 21 years of active service)
•• Reserve for personnel who have been offered the "Statut de
Carrier" (full career contract)
•• change the age limit for Maitre Principal (Senior Chief Petty
Officer) and Major (Master Chief Petty Officer) from 52 and 55 to 55
and 56 respectively. [Ref. 119]
The current and projected (incorporating proposed career path changes)
enlisted discharge profiles are graphically illustrated in Figure G-l.
43BAT (Brevet d'Aptitude Technique)—elementary technical training
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